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Abstract 
Enlarging Adlerian Theory: The Connections Between Adler's 
Individual Psychology and Varela's Principles of Biological 
Autonomy and the Implications of Those Connections for an 
Approach to Family/Systems Therapy. 
May 1986 
P. Lawrence Belove, B.S. Northwestern University 
M.A., Alfred Adler Institute of Chicago 
Ed.D. University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Jack Wideman 
Adler's Theory of Individual Psychology will be refined by 
referring to the Theory of Self-Organizing Systems 
articulated by Varela in Principles of Biological Autonomy. 
Two complementary ways to refer to system levels using 
Adlerian terms will be proposed; one, "style," meaning the 
system's interaction with what it is not, and two, 
"gemeinschaft," meaning the system as a self-regulating 
autonomous being. Of the many implications for Adlerian 
psychology of there being two complementary ways to refer to 
systems, one implication in particular is explored in depth: 
that there are also two, complementary ways to describe 
pathology; one, in terms of "goals," or the stylistic 
vi 
intentions of a component of a system, and two, in terms of 
"stages" of the deterioration of cooperation in a 
gemeinschaft. This new. Stages and Goals model of pathology 
will be described along with some of the implications of 
that new model for clinical practice. 
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CHAPTER I 
PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
GAPS IN ADLERIAN CLINICAL THEORY. 
Adlerian Theory and System Theory. 
The Adlerian tradition, which at one time found support in 
systems theory, now needs to catch up to current thought. 
When I refer to systems theory I am not refering to a theory 
of psychology or psychotherapy, but rather to a more 
elemental theory which is applicable equally to 
psychological, biological, social, and even chemical 
phenomena (Jantsch, 1980). Adlerian theory has always been 
built upon systemic concepts. Adler himself likened his 
theory to the holism of Smuts. (Adler, 1956). Rudolph 
Dreikurs, who was an influential pioneer in Adlerian Family 
treatment, said in 1954: "The terms feedback, 
servomechanisms, circular systems and circular processes 
express the same basic mechanisms and substantiate in 
mathematical and scientific terms what Adler visualized half 
a century ago" (Dreikurs, 1967a, p. 79). 
Comparisons and connections have been made in the past 
between Adlerian theory and systems theory. However, systems 
theory has recently developed concepts which not only 
substantiate, but also refine basic Adlerian constructs. 
Only recently has systems theory developed ways to formalize 
1 
2 
the ideas of self-organization, self-regulation and 
coherency the most basic Adlerian ideas. These 
formalizations are in the work of Prigogine, Lazio, 
(Jantsch, 1980) and particularly, in the life sciences, in 
the work of Maturana and Varela. These formalizations have 
been called, by Varela, "the principles of biological 
autonomy." This dissertation proposes to demonstrate how 
these principles may be incorporated into Adlerian 
psychology. 
There is a tradition in Adlerian theory for "referring 
outward" to strengthen fundamental constructs. Adler's own 
use of Vaihinger's Philosophy of 'As If,' in the early 
formulations of his theory is a particular case in point. 
(Adler, 1956). Varela's book. Principles of Biological 
Autonomy (1979) in the mid 1980's may have as much to offer 
in terms of strengthing fundamental Adlerian theory as did 
the Philosophy of 'As If' in the mid 1920's. The exploration 
of how Adlerian theory may be so enriched is the topic of 
this dissertation. 
There is a broader need that may also be served by this 
work. It will be served by the connections drawn between an 
established school of clinical psychology, the Individual 
Psychology of Alfred Adler, in this case, and systems 
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theory. Systems theory seems to have become a school of 
psychotherapy without becoming a school of psychology, which 
is, perhaps, a questionable turn of events. As an example of 
what I mean, let me quote the Family Systems Theory 
clinician Lynn Hoffman who wrote that "Family therapists are 
better at how to change it than they are at what to change." 
This quote was from the opening paragraphs of Chapter Ten in 
her book Foundations of Family Therapy (1981). The chapter 
was titled, "The Thing in the Bushes," an acknowldegment of 
a certain precariousness in the theory. The "thing in the 
bushes" reference was to the unknown thing rattling about 
that therapists are looking to eliminate when they work with 
families. 
Should we try to change or eliminate something when we do 
not understand what we are dealing with in the first place? 
The ecologists would argue "no." The Adlerian teacher, 
Harold Mosak, has said almost the same thing, speaking of 
strategic tactics in psychotherapy. He said, "They work, but 
it helps if you know a little psychology first." (Personal 
communication, 1976). 
My position is that we do learn the nature of what we are 
changing by watching how it responds to our change-efforts. 
We do get to know people only by having some dealings with 
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them. Nonetheless, our ability to describe what we are 
changing should match our ability to encourage changes. It 
is the mark of tact to be able to continually assess the 
effects of our actions upon others. Our assessment models 
should be as powerful as our change models. Our theories of 
psychology should be adequate to theories of psychotherapy. 
For these reasons, I think it is worth exploring the 
connections between systems theory — which has produced 
theories of change — and psychology, which produces 
theories and maps of the patterns of the life of the soul. 
It is possible that Adlerian psychology, when more 
explicitly connected to systems theory, has something to 
offer family system therapists. There are important 
connections to be drawn between family interaction patterns, 
described by systems theories, and the world described by 
Adler's theories, the world of meanings, subjectivity and 
individual lives (not to limit these phenomena to individual 
lives.) 
The connection between the individual and the larger system 
is the coming area of exploration in family therapy in 
general. Witness the exploration of the relationship between 
psychoanalytically-based object-relations theory and family 
therapy, following the lead of Whittaker and others (1982). 
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Adlerian theory may become an useful alternative vision of 
the world. 
Though there may be broader uses for the work here, the 
immediate purpose is to find ways to expand basic Adlerian 
theory into a theory of families and larger systems. Despite 
years of working with families, Adlerians have been slow to 
develop models describing their work in recent years. 
Dreikurs, Adler's follower, was writing models of family 
interaction patterns in 1940. (Terner and Pew, 1978). He was 
referring to cybernetic phenomena in 1949 (Dreikurs, 1967a). 
But precious little new has been written by Adlerians since 
that time. Hoffman's book. Foundations of Family Therapy , 
published in 1980, surveying important systemic ideas in the 
field in the past thirty years, includes not a single 
reference to Adlerian thinking. 
There have been articles written which propose to represent 
and describe Adlerian Family Therapy (Dinkmeyer and 
Dinkmeyer, 1981) (Dinkmeyer, Pew and Dinkmeyer, 1979). 
However, the model so described leaves much to be desired as 
a clinical model. For Adlerian Family Therapy, Dinkmeyer and 
his co-authors propose a psycho-educational model, a set of 
standardized interventions which includes training in 
communication skills, training in expressing feelings. 
training in encouragement and training in conflict 
resolution. 
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Here is their own description of the model: 
The overall goal of family therapy can be simply stated 
as the therapists working themselves out of their job 
by teaching the family to communicate accurately, 
honestly and openly with each member speaking for 
himself/herself about his/her own ideas and feelings. 
This overall goal is the outcome of the successful 
accomplishment of several specific goals. One of them 
is to teach the family members to resolve their own 
conflicts by relying on the principles of (1) 
manifesting mutual respect, (2) pinpoininting the 
issue, (3) reaching a new agreement, and (4) 
participating responsibly in decision making. 
(Dinkmeyer, Pew and Dinkmeyer, 1979, page 225) 
I do not believe the Dinkmeyer model qualifies as an 
acceptable realization of systems theory and I also believe 
acceptability in the light of systems theory is a legitimate 
criterion. I will discuss why I think the criterion is 
legitimate in a moment, but first I will justify my 
observation. 
The authors do not distinguish (in their writings) between 
individual-based and family-based phenomena. For example, on 
the one hand they claim that "the family can be understood 
in terms of the unity and patterns of its behavior. The 
therapist works to understand the family as a whole." 
(Dinkmeyer and Dinkmeyer, 1981, page 48). On the other 
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hand, when the authors present their treatment concepts, 
they proceed from a strictly individual focus, offering 
tentative hypotheses as to the "faulty beliefs" and 
mistaken perceptions" of the family members (page 49). 
There is nothing per se "unsystemic" about these 
interventions. Often family therapists will offer a 
re-interpretation or re-framing to an individual family 
member in the course of an interview. What is "unsystemic" 
is the inability to distinguish between individual-level and 
family-level "perceptions" and "beliefs." 
In the Dinkmeyer1s "Adlerian Family Therapy" article, in 
The American Journal of Family Therapy, the explanation of 
how the Adlerian works to "understand the family as a 
whole," is sketchy at best. For example: 
Focus on the Real Issue: Help People Identify Their 
Goals: 
In a conflict people frequently focus on the thing 
which on the surface appears to cause the conflict, 
such as clearing the table, hanging up clothes or being 
in on time. The argument centers on a particular task. 
We help the family most as they resolve the real issue, 
which is for both parent and child more often winning, 
power, getting even, or displaying inadequacy in order 
to be excused. The therapist helps the family members 
deal with the real issue by focusing on the purpose of 
the conflict. (Dinkmeyer, D. and Dinkmeyer, D., Jr., 
1981, page 50) 
The advantage of systems theory is its ability to help the 
therapist distinguish between phenomena produced by 
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individuals and that produced by larger entities. The 
ability to be sensitive to multiple levels is the criterion 
of systemic thinking. Descriptive propositions at the level 
of the individual may or may not be appropriate at the level 
of the couple, or family, or larger system. A systemic 
theory must make these distinctions and keep them well 
ordered. Are the "real issues" Dinkmeyer and Dinkmeyer refer 
to features of the family, of the individuals, of 
sub-groups, of the interaction between groups or 
individuals, or of the interaction between the therapist and 
family? I'm not sure whether the distinctions are required 
by Dinkmeyer's model. The critical point here is that they 
should be required. To require them and to be able to make 
them is a hallmark of the systemic perspective. The model 
which will be presented in this work will help the clinician 
make those distinctions. 
The American Association of Marriage and Family Therapy 
considers a therapist's ability to think systemically so 
important that familiarity with a model based in systems 
theory could become a requirement for clinical membership in 
that organization. In the July-August 1985 issue of Family 
Therapy News , the AAMFT newsletter, Insoo Kim Berg, Chair 
of the Commission on Supervision said that " We desire 
applicants who view supervision from the systemic 
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perspective. " Eventually AAMFT hopes to set standards for 
licensure in each of the United States. 
In conclusion, because of recent developments in systems 
theory there is much that can now be done with Adlerian 
theory to expand its ability to describe family patterns 
from the systemic perspectives. Furthermore, Adlerian theory 
needs those conceptual tools. 
The Proposal: Adler's Theory of Individual Psychology will 
be refined by referring to the Theory of Self-Organizing 
Systems. Specifically, a method for defining system levels 
in Adlerian terms will be developed. In addition, a 
Practical application of that refinement in terms of a model 
will be deliniated: the four stages of deterioration of 
cooperation. 
How the Presentation Will Be Organized. 
First, in Chapter Two, I will review the theory that will be 
used to evaluate and refine Adlerian theory. I will start 
with the basic perspective of Gregory Bateson and then 
proceed to Varela's theory of biological autonomy. Bateson 
was one of the first to connect system theory and psychology 
thereby enabling the invention of family therapy? Varela's 
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theory of self-organizing, or self-actualizing systems 
unfolds from Bateson's basic persective. (Varela, 1979) 
In Chapter Three, I will present Adler's theory along with a 
proposed refinement to allow for "systems level" 
conceptualizations. 
In Chapter Four, I will draw out some of the implications of 
the proposed refinement, especially as it leads to an 
additional perspective on pathology in Adlerian theory. I 
will show how one of the currently popular Adlerian models 
of pathology may be modified. I will construct a variation 
on Dr. Dreikurs' model, "The Four Goals of Disturbing 
Behavior in Children." The new model will be called "The 
Four Stages of Deterioration of Cooperation," and it will be 
proposed, for rigorous, theoretical reasons, not as a 
replacement, but as a complement to the Dreikurs model. 
In Chapter Five, I will explain the model, discuss it, and 
demonstrate its use, as far as I can understand it. I think 
the model has many possibilities to explore. I will discuss 
some of them. 
In Chapter Six, I will summarize. 
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It is my hope that this exercise will be stimulating for 
other Adlerians and that it will also invite readers 
unfamiliar with Adler to consider his work. I am encouraged 
in this ambition by two comments by two of my favorite 
authors. The Adlerian, Harold Mosak, in a recent interview 
in Individual Psychology said that he felt that Adlerian 
Psychology was suffering from the lack of people working at 
building theory and working at addressing central 
issues.(Bitter, 1985) I hope he finds in this work some of 
the core theory he would wish for Adlerian Psychology. The 
other author in whom I find encouragement is the family 
systems theorist, Paul Watzlawick, who wrote of Alfred Adler 
that "his rediscovery is long overdue. (Watzlawick, 1983, p. 
66)" Perhaps this work will aid that re-discovery. 
CHAPTER II 
SYSTEMS THEORY FOUNDATIONS FOR A THEORY OF CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY. 
Introduction. 
In the following chapter we will review the work of two 
authors who, I think, are primary sources for the system 
theory used to support psychotherapeutic theory. These 
authors are Bateson, and Varela. Bateson's thinking has been 
used to shape systems-based psychotherapy for at least 20 
years (Hoffman, 1981). Varela's work is just beginning to 
be applied (Keeney, 1982; Dell, 1982). However Varela's work 
is an extension of Bateson's (Dell, 1985; Varela, 1979). A 
third author, equal in importance to Varela is Umberto 
Maturana. However, since Maturana's work closely resembles 
Varela's and since an exposition of the differences between 
the two is beyond the scope of this work, Varela alone will 
be used as a principal resource. 
The review will be organized as follows: First, two 
fundamental ideas from Bateson's writing will be introduced: 
the idea of how we should think about ecological phenomena 
and, in the context of that, how we should think about 
particularly human phenomena. In terms of the latter, the 
applications of Bateson's work to psychology and ethics, we 
will summarize how Bateson himself declared his work 
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unfinished and in need of extension. Next, we will review 
certain central concepts from Varela's book, The Principles 
of Biological Autonomy ( which I will occassionally refer 
to as the "PBA"). 
The Quick and the Dead: Bateson's distiction. 
Credit for formulating the philosophical foundations of 
systemic family therapy has been given to Gregory Bateson 
(Hoffman, 1981) . These foundations spring from one simple 
premise which pervaded all Bateson's work. However, in 1972, 
Bateson published Steps to an Ecology of Mind , a 
collection of his essays over thirty-five years, and in the 
Introduction to the book, written in 1971, (Bateson, 1972a) 
he described that premise: There is an important 
distinction, between the rules for thinking about things 
that are alive, and the rules for thinking about things that 
are dead and that distinction must be respected. 
Things that are alive must be described and explained with 
appropriate terminology. For the "Quick," terms like 
feedback, patterns, order and information were appropriate. 
Life, the Quick, required an aesthetic vocabulary, a 
vocabulary of motion captured, of pattern, meaning, values, 
beauty and spirit. Only for the non-living should one use 
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terms like "energy" and "force" or ideas like "quantity," as 
in strength of emotion," or ideas like "pressure" as in 
pressure of needs and instincts." "Pressure" and 
"strength," Bateson argued, were misleading metaphors. In 
his famous example, he proposed that, if you kick a stone, 
you can explain what the stone does in terms of vector, 
force, pressure, strength, and inertia. However,if you kick 
a dog which is alive, you need a different vocabulary, an 
aesthetic vocabulary to explain what happens. 
In Mind and Nature (1979), his last book, he summarized 
his thinking. The mind versus body distinction is erroneous. 
From the point of view of all life through all time, 
learning, or changes in mind , and evolution, or changes in 
body , are equivalent processes. Only the scale differs. 
Learning is change which occurs over the lifetime of a 
single creature; evolution is the equivalent change in the 
lifetime of a species. Living beings are not living "things" 
but rather, living processes and all living processes feed 
into one another: all life is connected. 
And an essentially important idea comes forward with an 
appreciation of how all life is connected: what you, or I, 
or Science, might declare to be a "unit" of life, is always 
a matter of opinion. In Bateson's own words: 
15 
The division of the perceived universe into parts and 
wholes is convenient and may be necessary, but no 
necessity determines how it shall be done. (Bateson, 
1979, page 38) 
Hence from Bateson come the philosophical foundations of 
family therapy: One, the reality we deal with is a reality 
of patterns. Two, the patterns we take as objective, that 
is, how the divisions in the patterns occur, are instead 
something in the creation of which we constantly 
participate. Three, the whole pattern is divided up as much 
by the observer as by the observed. Proceeding from these 
core assumptions, psycho-therapists developed ways of 
describing, teaching and doing psychotherapy as if the 
psychic life of a family-as-a-whole were as valid an object, 
were as law-governed, and has much integrity and wisdom as 
the psychic life of an individual. The Batesonian premise 
supported the belief that families and other group systems, 
like individuals, are living, intelligent, self-defining 
entities. 
Bateson proposed a theory of the connectedness; Mind, 
Nature, all Life is necessarily a unity. But if everything 
is connected to everything else, what is the nature of 
individuality within the larger inter-connected whole? 
Individuality would appear to be a paradox in Bateson s 
paradigm. Bateson presented this paradox himself in his 
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epilogue to Mind and Nature . The epilogue is written as a 
dialogue between himself and his daughter. Having described 
the pattern which connects all life, he argues to his 
daughter that, from the point of view of "all life," the 
death of any individual creature or species is 
insignificant. And, if a death doesn't matter, neither does 
a life matter, at least from the view of the whole. 
This disquieting observation leads to the questions that 
Bateson leaves as his legacy: If this Toaist vision of an 
interconnected life flow is to be the foundation for 
behavioral science, where and how does individuality fit? 
Here is how Bateson poses his question. It is in the form of 
a dialogue between himself and his daughter. He has her 
press the question at him as he struggles to frame his 
answer: 
Daughter: So what? 
Father: I keep telling you: There is no "what." A 
million points or none. 
Daughter: Then why write this book? 
Father: That's different. This book, or you and me 
talking, and so on— these are only little pieces of 
the bigger universe. The total self-healing tautology 
has no "points" that you can enumerate. But when you 
break it up into little pieces, that's another story. 
"Purpose" appears as the universe is dissected. What 
Paley called " design" and Darwin called "adaptation." 
Daughter: Just an artifact of dissection? But what's 
dissection for? This whole book is a dissection. 
What's it for? 
Father: Yes, it's partly dissection and partly 
synthesis. And I suppose that under a big enough 
macroscope (sic.) no idea can be wrong, no purpose 
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destructive, no dissection misleading. 
Father: There are subcycles of living and dying within 
the bigger, more enduring ecology. But what shall we 
say of the death of the larger system? Our biosphere? 
Perhaps under the eye of heaven or Shiva, it doesn't 
matter. But it's the only one we know...and I suppose 
it is a mistake of sorts for a species to be a party to 
its own extinction. 
Daughter: So what? Why write the book? 
Father: And there is some pride in it, too, a feeling 
that if we are all going down to the sea like lemmings, 
there should be at least one lemming taking notes and 
saying, "I told you so." To believe that I could stop 
the race to the ocean would be even more arrogant that 
saying "I told you so." (Bateson, 1979, page 207-208) 
Under a big enough "macroscope" individuality disappears. 
And, in a disturbing way, disappearing along with 
individuality are such human issues as concern for right and 
wrong, good and bad, purpose and meaning. So Bateson askes, 
through the voice of his daughter, why should a particular 
person write a book about the "meaning of it all," if there 
is meaning only in the particulars and by the particulars? 
It is as if to ask, "Isn't Science suppose to find Truth?" 
The equivalent question is this: how can we have a big 
theory which supports behavioral sciences that doesn t 
provide for individual consciousness and individual 
concerns, the meanings of each life? 
The same question Bateson left - how to sort through the 
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troublesome and paradoxical relationship between the values 
of the whole systems and the values of the individuals in 
those systems is reviewed in an article by Taggart (1982) 
with much the same conclusion: to resolve the paradox 
requires more work and that work has not yet been done. 
Bateson left hints as to how he thought the question should 
be addressed: there is either no point or millions of 
points. I believe he was suggesting that the answer has 
something to do with the scattering and patterning of 
individualities, that he thought we needed to consider the 
fact of millions of points (of view). 
Among the hints Bateson left about how to move from the 
unconcerned flow of the Tao to the pressing concerns and 
meanings that shaped individual lives were what he called, 
the " next great untouched questions." These were, in 
Bateson's vocabulary, "Consciousness" and "Aesthetics." In 
these issues were to clues to the relationship Bateson saw 
between the living unity and the living individualities 
which composed it. Both Aesthetics and Consciousness were 
points-of-view issues, both were descriptions of local 
phenomena, both were concepts that got at the relationship 
between individuality and larger systems. But way did 
Batesons mean by these terms? 
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Bateson was coy about defining "Consciousness." At one point 
he said that nobody knew anything about it but everyone 
assumed that everyone did know about it. Therefore, he would 
not define it, assuming everyone one knew as much as he did. 
(1972b, page 139). He did emphasize, however, that 
consciousness was only a part of a person's make-up (1972b) 
and that it had something to do with purpose, problem 
solving, and the intentional manipulation of the environment 
(1972c) . 
Bateson's idea of "aesthetics" has been the subject of a 
complicated debate in the systems oriented family therapy 
community, the summarizing of which would be beyond the 
scope of this project. In Bateson's own writings 
"Aesthetics" seems to have something to do with the 
integration and harmoney of consciousness with the larger 
whole of which it is a part. In "Style, Grace, and 
Information in Primitive Art," he described it as the 
integration of thinking and feeling and the integration of 
skill and sensitivity. In other articles (1972c, 1972d, 
1972e, 1972f) and in his book, Mind and Nature (1979) he 
described aesthetics as the integration between inner 
processes and outer environment as though it were a life 
form's harmony with its environment. An aethetic response 
indicates ones ability to recognize in the "primrose by the 
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river's brim," for example, something that is also within 
the self and to act as though informed by that knowledge. At 
one place he said,"I faced them with what was an aesthetic 
question: How are you related to this creature?" (1979, page 
9) 
Consciousness and aesthetics are both terms that have to do 
with the relationship between an individual and the larger 
system of which that individual is a part, how we are each 
apart" and "a part?" The work of Varela addresses these 
questions in a more formal sense and is thereby an extension 
of Bateson's work. 
The Principles of Biological Autonomy. 
Where Bateson's theory is about "all life," the Principles 
of Biological Autonomy (Varela, 1979), or PBA, is a theory 
about individualities in the context of all life. The theory 
describes the universally pervasive phenomena of 
particularity; everything seen is always seen from a 
particular point of view, by a particular local observer or 
observer community. 
The Idea of Complementarity. 
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A central motif of the PBA vocabulary is that almost all 
major concepts are defined as "complementarities." The idea 
of complementarity describes the relationship between the 
inside and outside of an individuality. For example you 
could speak of a flowering plant in terms of how its 
interior parts are interrelated as a system and/or you could 
speak of the same plant in terms of how it fills and 
ecological niche and fits into its environment. The two 
descriptions are complementary. In a similar sense, 
intrapsychic phenomena are complementary to interactional 
phenomena. The PBA theory is about how individualities 
"create" or "define" themselves and how the internal and 
interactional aspects of self-definition are best understood 
as being complementary. 
Varela defines complementarity as "the constructive 
interplay between two interdependent visions that raises 
ones level of understanding to a new level" (1979, page 
xvi). In another context, he defines it as the relationship 
between "distinct but interdependent cognitive perspectives 
of the observer community" (1979, page 104). 
To describe how complementarity is used to structure the 
Principles of Biological Autonomy, Varela proposed a 
semi-mathematical way of representing it called a "star 
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statement." The basic star statement looks like this: 
the it / the process leading to it. (page 99) 
Star statement complementarities can be used to describe how 
we tend to observe life forms as though they existed in 
levels. We see individuals which are inside of families 
which are inside of extended families which are inside of 
communities and so on. The interplay of parts at one level 
can be seen as the whole at a higher level. Systems of 
interacting cells (which are self-containing, self-defining 
networks of process) are also "organs;" interacting organs 
are also "bodies;" bodies in interaction are also 
"societies." 
When we think this way, we move in logic across levels. The 
process of the parts equals the whole. This relationship 
across levels is implied by the slash, "/". Varela called 
the logical transformation "imbrication." In "imbrication," 
one term of the pair emerges (to an observer) from the 
other. The terms mutually specify each other. Imbrication is 
a different sort of process than synthesis because, in 
imbrication, nothing new emerges except to an observer. In 
synthesis, the original parts are lost in the formation of 
the new synthesis. (Varela, 1978, page 101). A 
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complementarity is a way of making explicit a trick of the 
mind. 
Here are some of the complementarities that will be used and 
explained in this dissertation: 
1. * = The autonomous system seen in relation to its 
context/ The internal processes by which autonomy is 
created. 
( For example, the squirrel may be seen as not only the 
animal in the tree, the system seen in relation to its 
context, but also the system composed of interrelationships 
between the squirrel's nervous system, circulatory system, 
gastro-intestinal system, skeletal-muscular system and so 
on. The latter version emphasizes the process by which the 
squirrel's autonomy is created, the former version 
emphasizes the autonomous squirrel.) 
2. * = Organization, or the underlying principles/ Plastic 
structure, or the pattern of flexibility . 
(The squirrel was once a fetus, then a baby, and now a full 
grown squirrel. Also, the squirrel can be asleep, awake, 
tired, famished, of fully fed. Something changes and 
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something does not. "Organization” is the word for what does 
not change: the squirrel is always the squirrel. "Plastic 
structure," is the word for what does change. All the ways 
the squirrel does change is in the service of making sure 
that certain things don't change, namely, the life and 
identity of the squirrel.) 
* = Life Style, the characteristic pattern of movement of 
an individual system in the social world/ The Gemeinschaft, 
or dynamic cooperation between the composing systems and 
complexes which create the individuality. 
(The way the family as a whole relates to the community, the 
school, the local charities, the business community,— this 
is its Style, one way of seeing the family. The family is 
also a gemeinschaft, a community of members who deal with 
each other, regardless of the specific context, according to 
certain basic principles.) 
4. * = Pathology, or strains in the fabric of cooperation/ 
The intentions of the cooperating participants 
( A very specific example will help here: John intends to 
make Mary change and Mary intends to make John change. These 
are the individual intentions. These individual intentions 
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create a strain in their marriage. To look at the strain is 
to look at it from one level. To look at the individual 
intentions is to look at it from a different level.) 
The concept of imbrication also says that the structure of 
levels that an observer responds to is not merely a fiction 
created by the observer to organize perception but is also a 
phenomena of self—organization. Levels are both perceived 
and self-created or inherent in the phenomena. Here is how 
Varela makes the point: 
There is no whole system without interconnection of its 
parts and there is no whole system without an 
environment. Such pairs are mutually interdependent: 
each defines the other. ( Varela, 1979. page 99) 
He is saying that the levels exist and that one or the other 
level is implied in every observation. To distinguish 
something is to choose to examine one or the other side of a 
complementarity. It is important to notice how taking one or 
the other side does shape perception. Here is how Varela 
states it: 
If the observer chooses to pay attention to the 
environment, he treats the system as a simple entity 
with given properties and seeks the regularities of its 
interaction with the environmment. On the other hand, 
the observer may choose to focus on the internal 
structure of the system, viewing the environment as 
background. From this viewpoint the properities of the 
system emerge from the interaction of its components. 
(Varela, 1979, page 85)...At a given level of the 
heirarchy a particular systemcan be seen as outside to 
the system below it and as an inside [part of] the 
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system above it. (page 86) 
These principles will be applied to the Adlerian concepts of 
Life Style and Community and will be used to organize a 
model of pathology. 
The Basic Complementarity: Autonomy and Interaction. 
The basic complementarity in Varela's model involves the 
relationship between two ways of understanding the life of a 
living system; one, in terms of internal relationships; two, 
in terms of how the system interacts with the world. The two 
processes are separate and distinct realms of observation, 
yet what happens in one realm can be related to what happens 
in the other. For example, think about the difference 
between brain chemistry and styles of observable behavior. 
Another example of a complementary relationship between 
internal processes and interactional processes is the one 
that exists between national politics and foreign policy. 
Two domains; two frames of reference; autonomy and allonomy, 
internal processes and interaction. In the autonomy frame of 
reference, we become interested in internal regulation, the 
"self", value systems, evaluation schemes, and personal 
biases. The rules governing these processes obtain 
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regardless of the context of the individuality unless the 
system dis-integrates. In fact, it is because these 
processes are independent of context that they are able to 
maintain autonomy. 
In the complementary frame of reference, allonomy, we become 
interested in behavior in context. The system is seen as a 
simple unity, a "black box." We are interested in the 
manipulation of the environment and the manipulation by the 
environment. 
These two frames of reference are complementary. One is not 
to be opposed to the other. Even though we know the realms 
of discourse are different, we do expect a person's values 
to fit with their behavior. 
Organization and Structure. 
Organization and structure are also complementary processes, 
but they are both features of autonomy. Taken together they 
describe how living entities can have a separate existance 
and still also be part of a larger whole. Organization 
refers to how there are certain principles about any 
particular living being that never changes and structure 
refers to the way these principles might have to be realized 
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one way in one context and a different way in a different 
context. 
The relations that define a machine as a unity, and 
determine the dynamics of interactions and 
transformations it may undergo as such a unity, we call 
the organization of the machine. The actual relations 
that hold between the components that integrate a 
concrete machine in a give space constitute its 
structure." (Varela, 1979, page 9) 
Organization" is the coherent whole of underlying 
principles, "structure" is how those principles are realized 
in physical space at any give time. (The term, "machine" in 
the above quote simply means "biological system.") 
An example of the complementarity, organization /structure, 
is the caterpillar that becomes a butterfly: two structures 
manifesting one organization. 
Another example of the organization/structure relationship 
is the relationship Alfred Adler describes between an 
individual's "law of movement" and his, or her, behavioral 
repertoire. (Forgus and Shulman, 1979) Adler describes an 
enduring set of organizational principles is embodied by 
every manifestation of a life form: 
We are able to infer the familiar composer from an 
unfamiliar melody, the architectural style from an 
ornament, always from the connnection of the part with 
the whole. It is the same in the case of a person, 
except that rarly does anyone fashion his life in such 
an artfully perfect form. (Adler, 1956, page 196) 
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A more detailed exploration of this idea will be attempted 
in the following chapter. 
The inherent principles of organization are maintained by 
each creature's own actions. The structure of a creature is 
said to be constantly compensating for perturbances by 
the environment and in so doing, the organism is reasserting 
its organization . 
Structural Plasticity and Cognition. 
If the relationship between structure, organization and the 
environment is examined in a certain way it can appear that 
the flexibility of structure is a medium between 
organization and environment: an organism interacts with the 
world by constantly readjusting itself so as to maintain its 
identity. This process is cognition. Cognition occurs 
through the flexibility of structure. 
A particularaly suggestive analogy is the way radios recieve 
signals. A radio receiver creates a tiny radio field tuned 
to a specific frequency. That field is perturbed by the 
broadcast signal. By amplifying the perturbance the radio 
produces music. Similarly, "blank" recording tape is tape 
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which carries a stable signal called a "bias." By industrial 
convention, a playback machine reads this bias as "silence." 
The patterns of deviation from the bias are read as "music." 
An organism knows its environment and itself by offering 
to the environment a version of itself, its bias, and 
letting the environment create perturbations and 
interpreting those perturbations. 
An organism's ability to "know" what is going on beyond its 
own borders consists in the plasticity of its structure. The 
quality of its ability to know consists in the subtlety of 
its plasticity. The color-blind man cannot see the 
difference between green and yellow. The limits of 
plasticity define the limits of cognitive realms. Different 
patterns of plasticity define different cognitive realms 
and different ways to "tune in." Seeing is one kind of 
plasticity, hearing is another. The different cognitive 
realms in human personality are called, in the common 
parlance, "sensitivities," or "skills." 
Structural Coupling. 
Plasticity establishes a relationship with the environment. 
A particularly important style of plasticity is called 
structural coupling Structural coupling is a stable 
pattern in the general flexibility that creates a stable 
relationship between the creature and that to which it is 
coupled. Structural coupling is a broad term that includes 
both what we call "habits" as well as what we call 
"relationships" in human affairs. 
Varela quotes Maturana's definition of structural coupling 
Let us review that defining paragraph one sentence at a 
time: 
The continued interactions of a structurally plastic 
•system in an environment with recurrent perturbations 
will produce a continual selection of the system's 
structure... 
A continuing selection of the system's structure is, among 
other things, a continuing adjustment of the cognitive 
realm. So, for example, if the refrigerator noise is alway 
in the background, the recurrent perturbations lead your 
hearing to adjust so you do not notice it. On the other 
hand, if you walk into bright sunlight, the brightness 
(recurrent perturbation) leads your eyes to adjust so you 
can see. You experience a selection of your own vision 
system's structure. Structural coupling is like 
acclimatization. 
To continue with the same quote: 
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This [ semi—stable adjustment of the ] structure will 
determine, on the one hand, the state of the system and 
its domain of allowable perturbations, and on the other 
hand will allow the system to operate in an environment 
without disintegration. We refer to this process as 
structural coupling... 
In other words, what you are doing "now" places a limit on 
what you are able to do "next." That is why you have to wait 
for your eyes to re-adjust to a radical change in light 
levels. It is why some people have to "calm down" after an 
argument with one person before having a friendly talk with 
another person. It is also why so much emphasis is given in 
the ancient wisdoms to the change that must take place 
between a bride and her family of origin in order for a 
marriage to be launched successfully. Human affairs- 
acknowledges structural coupling in the way we prioritize 
relationships and in our concepts of loyalty. Again, Varela: 
If we can consider the system's environment also as a 
structurally plastic system, then the system and the 
environment will have an interlocked history of 
structural transformations, selecting each other's 
trajectories. (Varela, 1979, page 33) 
Please notice that there are two ways to talk about 
structural coupling. We can talk about structural coupling 
as a process of one particular system, and as the 
modification of one particular system. It is in this sense 
that we would say, for example, "John is a married man," and 
expect the phrase to convey implications concerning the 
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limits on his behaviors, the particular sensitivities he 
might bring to any situation and the structure of the 
loyalties that govern his life. 
But there is also a kind of reciprocal structural coupling 
in which systems are coupled to each other, as in 
marriage." Two people who are married may be said (to refer 
to the previous quotation) to have "an interlocked history 
of structural transformations which select each other's 
trajectories." It means that two lives join to become like 
one and to make one co-ordinated path through life. Systems 
so coupled are called "higher order autonomous systems." 
(Varela, 1979, page 50). 
Higher Order Autonomous Systems 
There are several important things to note about higher 
order autonomous systems. This concept, which contains all 
the concepts discussed above, will guide our discussion of 
the relationship between autonomous individualities which 
are components of a system and the whole system they form. 
First in a higher order autonomous system, there is a higher 
order organization which defines the identity of that higher 
order system. "There is also a selective pressure such that 
34 
the individual autonomy of each component system is 
subordinated to the environment defined by the autonomy of 
the whole." (Varela, 1978, page 51) in simpler words, being 
part of a team means following certain rules. 
With married couples, the individuals must cooperate to 
define and create the couple. Reciprocally, the couple thus 
created has a life of its own which shapes and develops the 
personalities of the individuals composing it. But there is 
a limit. Each component must preserve and nurture it's 
separate self while also cooperating to preserve and nurture 
the whole. If a component loses its individuality, then the 
higher order unity also changes its nature. 
There is also a higher order plastic structure and a higher 
order cognitive realm. Here is Varela on that subject: 
There is a next higher level in the coherence of a unit 
(sic.) to which we have no direct access, but to which 
we contribute and in which we exist. To this next 
higher level belong the characteristics of mind we 
attribute to ourselves individually; in fact, what we 
experience as our mind cannot truly be separted from 
this network to which we connect and through which we 
interdepend." (Varela, 1979, page 270) 
To use the example of the couple again, we would say that 
there are realms of reality available to him only together 
with her (and visa versa) by virtue of their coupleness, not 
available to either of them separately. This higher order 
35 
reality shapes their individuality. One example of this is 
the creation of new life, which can only be done in 
partnership. Another example is the way certain rituals and 
ceremonies can be "observed" only by groups and not by 
individuals. 
Yet another example of a "higher order cognitive realm to 
which we contribute and in which we exist" is the 
sensitivity to reality created not only in specific academic 
communities conversations but also in groups and cliques. 
Specific languages, which create cognitive realms, are 
formed though higher order unities. 
Possibly all that we hold sacred and profound is that which 
unites us in a larger body than our own. Adler's definition 
of mental health, to be discussed in the next chapter, will 
hold that the measure of a person's mental health is his or 
her emotional and mental breadth. Breadth is measured by the 
highest order unity to which one can feel that they are 
contributing without violating the integrity of their own or 
other intermediate unities. 
Operational and Functional Explanations . 
The issue of "methods of explanation" takes into 
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consideration how we can talk about what we observe without 
violating the Principles of Biological Autonomy. The issue 
acknowledges that all observations originate with an 
observer who is a participant in the system. 
Varela suggests that we distinguish two kinds of 
explanation. First, however, let us define "explanation.” An 
explanation is a way of "making sense" out of data. 
According to Bateson (1972a), it is the way the "facts" are 
connected by the theory. Theory, he says, is all 
connections, no facts; description, he says, is all facts, 
no connections. Explanation is the intermediate concept. 
Therefore, when Varela suggests that there be two kinds of 
explanation, he is saying that there are two ways that we 
can "make sense" of what we observe, two kinds of patterns 
of connections we can use. 
Varela says that, since we see systems as either autonomous 
or interacting, we tend to create explanations that are 
either operational or functional. Operational explanations 
describe internal patterns of interaction, simply, how 
something operates : "This happens, then this, then this." 
To quote Varela: 
In the operational description the fundamental 
assumption is that phenomena occur through a network of 
nomic (lawlike) relationships that follow one another. 
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In contrast, functional explanations describe a relationship 
to context: The function (purpose, meaning) of this is to do 
that. 
Functional explanations always include the observer's 
guesses about purpose. For example, Varela describes an 
experiment in which a frog's eye is surgically rotated. When 
the frog "sees" a fly it sticks its tongue at the fly, but 
the frog's tongue misses the fly by the same angle as the 
surgical rotation of its eye. Is it the "purpose" of the 
tongue sticking out to catch the fly? This experiment 
demonstrates that, when we say that the "real purpose" was 
to catch the fly, we introduce some assumptions of our own 
into the explanation. Such is the nature of functional 
explanations. When it comes to describing functions or 
purposes, the observer has to rely on his or her own 
imagination and sensitivities to create the explanation. 
Something of the observer enters the observation. When we 
speak about purpose and meaning in the lives of others we 
necessarily use our own outlook, values, and structure as a 
standard and as a resource. 
In comparison, operational explanations are the observer's 
collection of correlations, as in. I notice that when this 
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changes, that also changes, therefore the two must operate 
together." 
A good specific example of the interplay between the two 
kinds of explanation might be the well-known 
"Nag-Withdrawal" cycle described by Watzlawick, Beavin and 
Jackson in Pragmatics of Human Communication (1967). 
In Pragmatics the authors suggested the following: 
"to an outside observer, a series of communications can 
be viewed as an uninterrrupted sequence of 
interchanges. However, the participants in the 
interaction always introduce what ... [can be termed] 
... punctuation of the sequence of events" (Watzlawick, 
et al., page 54). 
The "punctuation," Watzlawick, et.al, referred to is 
underlined in these sentences: "She nags because he 
withdraws," or "He withdraws because she nags." 
"Punctuation," creates "functional explanations." The 
operational explanations are punctuation free; the cycle: "/ 
Nag/ Withdrawal/ Nag/ Withdrawal/ etc" is an operational 
explanation. 
Watzlawick 's argument, at the time, was that the view of 
the uninterrupted sequence was preferable to the view of the 
punctuated sequence. "In the analysis of how people affect 
each other in their interaction, we will not consider the 
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specifics of genesis or product to be nearly so important as 
the ongoing organization of interaction" (page 130). 
The Principles of Biological Autonomy suggests a more 
complex analysis, saying that the two kinds of explanation 
are complementary. The PBA agrees with the Pragmatics 
analysis that functional explanations, or punctuations, are 
dispensable when an operational explanation is available. 
Individual punctuations are dispensable relative to some 
purposes of an inquiring community. However, the inquiring 
community usually has additional purposes. 
If the inquiring community is a team of clinicians, their 
inquiry usually involves the consideration of several 
levels, among them 1) the dynamics between the parts of the 
system 2) the system itself 3) the relationship between the 
system and its environment, 4) the next higher order system 
and so on. That particular community of clinicians might 
want 1) functional explanations for the individuals: the 
purpose of his withdrawing/her nagging 2) an operational 
explanation for the system: Their nag/withdrawal cycle? 3) 
a functional explanation for the couple as a couple : they 
"nag-withdraw" each other to give his mother-in-law 
something to do since her husband died? 4) an operational 
explanation of that system: She nags , he withdraws, her 
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mother gets involved, then she stops nagging, she stops 
withdrawing and her mother gets distant. 
Summary of the Review of Systems Theory 
The Principles of Biological Autonomy and the 
presuppositions of Bateson are already highly suggestive of 
a theory of clinical psychology. I have tried to encourage 
this line of thought by choosing examples from human affairs 
to illustrate the basic points rather than, as Maturana, 
Bateson, and Varela have, examples from botany, zoology, and 
molecular biology. 
The central concepts reviewed were the following: 
From Bateson: 
1. Life must be described using a language of pattern, not 
one of matter and energy. 
2. Fundamental to all Life Sciences must be an appreciation 
of ecology. 
From the Principles of Biological Autonomy: 
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3. The basic complementarity: all life forms exist 
autonomously and all life forms interact. 
4. Organization and structure: autonomy in interaction is 
created through the interplay between unchanging forming 
principles and flexibile reponses to the environment. 
5. Cognition: A life form's interaction with its environment 
is its knowledge of its environment. 
6. Structural Coupling: The flexibility of a life form is 
limited by the more enduring patterns of relationship it 
established with its environment. 
7. Higher order autonomous unities: the enduring 
relationships between living forms tend to acquire life and 
form of their own encompassing, informing and ennobling the 
lives of the components. 
8: Operational and functional explanations: the 
complementary patterns of observation described in the 
principles of biological autonomy should also be reflected 
in the ways we organize our thoughts, in terms of 
operational explanations to explain autonomy processes, and 
in terms of functional explanations to explain interactions. 
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In the next chapter I re-examine the fundamentals of 
Adlerian Psychology organizing that review using these eight 
concepts from the Principles of Biological Autonomy. 
CHAPTER III 
THE INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ALFRED ADLER 
AND A SUGGESTED REFINEMENT. 
Introduction. 
The purpose here is to use the principles of biological 
autonomy to strengthen and clarify Adler’s theory and to 
refine it. The specific purpose is to develop a method for 
defining system levels in Adlerian terms. 
In the previous chapter we reviewed the PBA. In this 
chapter we will review Adler's Individual Psychology using 
the eight central concepts from the previous chapter which 
summarized Varela's model. 
In part one of this chapter, Adler's and Bateson's basic 
assumptions will be shown to correspond. The two basic 
Adlerian ideas of Life Style and Social Interest will be 
shown to capture the basic sense of the PBA and also to 
illuminate PBA concepts. It will also be shown how Adler's 
ideas about subjectivity provide an important and 
acknowledged missing dimension of Varela's model. 
In part two, it will be shown that there is a certain 
precision in the PBA vocabulary that is missing in Adlerian 
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vocabulary. The PBA clearly distinguishes between one level 
of system and another and the relationship betweeen adjacent 
levels. A way for Adlerian vocabulary to do the same will 
be proposed. 
Part One: A Correspondence of Two Theories. 
#1: Life must be described using a language of pattern, not 
one of matter and energy1.1 
Adler, like Bateson, was against materialistic metaphor. 
Here are Adler's words: 
"Every semblance of causality in the psychical life is 
due to the tendency of many psychologists to present 
their dogma disguised in mechanistic or physical 
similies_It is plain that from a standpoint like this 
few of the fundamental varieties of man's psychical 
life can be observed." (Adler, 1964, page 13) 
Like Bateson, Adler insisted on an aesthetic vocabulary. The 
concept Adler used to describe personality was life style 
or style of living. In the concept of "Life Style" the 
operative noun is "style," which is an aesthetic term whose 
meaning implies "pattern of patterns." The basic unit is 
pattern, not something which can be weighed, measured or 
quantified. 
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#2: Fundamental to all Life Sciences must be an appreciation 
of ecology, 
Adler not only acknowledged the connectedness of life, but 
went so far as to suggest that the extent to which anyone 
acknowedged that connectedness was a measure of mental 
health. To act as though one understood one's participation 
in the ecology of the community and the earth is to act with 
"Social Interest" or, to use the orginal German term, with 
"Gemeinschaftsgefuhl. " Adler described social interest in 
the following way: 
Social Interest Is at the basis of any relationship of 
the child toward people, animals, plants and objects, , 
and signifies the cohesion (die Verwachsenheit) with 
our life, the affirmation, the conciliation with it. 
(Ansbacher, 1980) 
A more detailed discussion of the term appears below. 
#3: The basic complementarity: all life forms exist 
autonomously and all life forms interact^ 
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The PBA stressed that any autonomous entity should be 
understood in two separate, but complementary ways; one, in 
terms of its "innards," — the internal processess; the 
other, in terms of the "actions" — the entity as a simple 
whole interacting with the environment. Adler's idea of Life 
Style does include both the "innards" and the "actions" 
sides of the complementarity but does not explicitly 
separate them. The advantage of the PBA theory which does 
explicitly differentiate between innards and actions is that 
the theory implicitly calls attention to the boundary 
between the two. This boundary, which has no name in the 
theory, but which we will call "the autonomy line" defines a 
systems level. 
Bateson's analogy for autonomy can be used to make the same 
point about complementary processes. Bateson said 
individuality was like a smoke ring. A smoke ring is a torus 
of air, twirling in on itself, made visible by smoke. 
(Bateson, 1977) It is the activity of the ring which 
creates the boundary. With a smoke ring there are two 
separate forms of movement. There is the process of the 
"innards," the swirling movement that creates the autonomy 
and there is the "action," which is the way the ring drifts 
through the air. Of course, in living forms, the swirling 
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motion is self-generated. 
Adler's idea of style has a similar dual aspect. A person, 
like an artist, evolves an identity. And, at the same time, 
a person moves through the world maintaining that identity 
as style in a variety of contexts. However, the dual aspect 
is not explicit. At the end of this chapter an Alderian way 
of referring to the two kinds of motion separately will be 
proposed. 
#4: Organization and structure: autonomy in interaction is 
created through the interplay between unchanging forming 
principles and flexible responses to the environment. 
To understand this idea it is important to set the smoke 
ring analogy aside and go back to Bateson's thought 
experiment of what happens when you kick a dog (Bateson, 
1972a). The dog responds for reasons that have more to do 
with the dog than with the kick. The dog's actions are 
asserting a truth about the dog's innards. This is an 
example of the interplay of organization and structure. It 
is also an example of the processes of self-definition and 
action. 
Griffith and Powers, in The Adlerian Lexicon (1984), 
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define "Life Style" in a similar way emphasizing both sides 
of this interplay but not separating them out as we are 
recommending they should be in Adlerian theory. Nonetheless, 
both sides are signaled. Here is how they do it: 
Life Style. This term in Adler's Individual Psychology 
is congruent with, but must be contrasted to, the terms 
"personality" and "ego" in other psychological systems. 
Adler first used the too-easily reified and 
misunderstood term "Life Plan" but abandoned it in 
favor of "Life-Style" in order to convey a sense of the 
creative, artistic side of the development of the 
unique individual. The Style of Living refers to (1) 
the person's characteristic way of operating in the 
social field, and (2) the basic convictions concerning 
self, others, and the world which form the person's 
schema of biased apperception. (Griffith and Powers, 
1984, page 13) 
This Adlerian definition of Life Style is similar to the PBA 
characterization of individuality as the interplay of 
organization and structure. Plastic structure is a person s 
"characteristic way of operating" in his or her context. 
Organization is the matrix of basic principles, or 
"convictions," around which all behavior is organized. 
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The Adlerian definition of Life Style clearly includes the 
idea of organization as a matrix of basic principles: 
The Life Style is the "rule of rules" for the 
individual.... not merely a collection of rules, it is 
the organization of all rules into a pattern which 
dominates not only the rules but all coping activity. 
(Shulman, 1973a, page 21) 
The Adlerian understanding of Life Style also clearly 
includes a sense that self-consistency is not just a given, 
but is something achieved through action in the world. Here 
are Adler's words: 
Every individual represents both a unity of personality 
and the individual fashioning of that unity. The 
individual is thus both the picture and the artist. 
(Adler, 1956, p. 177) 
But individuality is established, once the picture is 
fashioned, so to speak, it is organization which pervades 
and shapes all expressions of self in the world. Turning 
again to the Adlerian Lexicon: 
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[The child's ] opinion of life, which is at the bottom 
of his attitude to life and is neither shaped into 
words nor expressed in thought, is his own masterpiece. 
Thus, the child arrives at his law of movement which 
aids him after a certain amount of trining to obtain a 
style of life, in accordance with which we see the 
individual thinking, feeling and acting through-out his 
whole life. (Adler, in Griffith and Powers, 1984, p. 
145) 
Every action is therefore understood in a double, 
complementary, sense. First, there is a private logic to 
every action, an expression of internal consistancy. In 
addition, there is also a common sense, how the action plays 
out in the consensual world. (Griffith and Powers, 1984) 
Rudolph Dreikurs used to demonstrate this private meaning, 
which differed from the common sense, by asking in a therapy 
group why someone did what he did. He would have others in 
the group guess and many common sensical reasons would come 
forward. "Is that the reason?" "No." "Is that the reason?" 
"No." Then Dreikurs would ask, "May I guess?" If the 
person said yes, Driekurs would say, "Could it be that 
you....etc"...and propose a private reason. If the person 
showed a spontaneous startle response, along with a smile, 
what Dreikurs called " a recognition reflex, then Dreikurs 
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would know he had guessed what he called, "the hidden 
reason." He had discovered how the particular behavior was 
consistent with the rest of the personality. (Robert L. 
Powers, personal communication, 1977) 
*—Cognition: A life form's interaction with its 
environment is its knowledge of its environment. 
The rule of rules is achieved and maintained in terms of 
what people do. It is also manifested in terms of what 
people think they know. 
In the PBA cognition is a creature's own experience of the 
plasticity of its own structure. A creature's way of being 
in the world is "perturbed" from an optimum condition and 
the creature's efforts to "compensate," or restore the 
optimum i_s cognition. 
This is a broad definition of cognition. Whether someone is 
having their eardrum vibrated and is interpreting their 
body's efforts to stabilize the eardrum as "sound," or 
whether someone is having their self-definition vibrated by 
a court summons from the tax bureau and are interpreting 
their attempts to re-balance their metabolism as the 
"meaning" of that experience, in either case, in this model, 
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it is still cognition, the experience of perturbation and 
compensation. 
It is the same in Adler's scheme: 
Perception can never be compared with a photographic 
apparatus; it always contains something of the 
individual's uniqueness... The child perceives in his 
environment only that which for some reason fits his 
previously formed uniqueness... what a person 
perceives, and how he does so constitutes his 
particular uniqueness. Perception is more than a mere 
physical process, it is a psychological function, and 
from the way in which a man perceives, one can draw 
profound conclusions regarding his inner self. (Adler, 
1956, page 210) 
Subjectivity 
A particularly important form of cognition, for 
psychotherapy, is subjectivity, that private and most unique 
inner experience. The PBA does not directly explore the 
concept of subjectivity — the autonomous systems experience 
of its own autonomy —, even though Varela identifies it as 
a central theme. (Varela, 1978, note on page xiii) It is as 
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though too much groundwork needed yet to be laid before the 
PBA could take up the issue. 
However, Adler's theory is a theory of the mechanisms of 
subjectivity. (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, in Adler, 1956). 
What might make Adler's theory interesting to family 
therapists working with Varela's model is that Adler 
describes individual subjectivity as though it operated 
according to the principles of biological autonomy. 
Subjectivity, in the Adlerian theory, is what happens when 
structure operates purposefully to insure that a unique 
organization is realized in the world. 
Consider the role Adler assigns to feelings and emotions: 
The feelings of an individual bear the impress of the 
meaning he gives to life and of the goal he has set for 
his strivings....The emotions are ...psychological 
movement forms, limited in time. They appear always 
they serve a purpose corresponding to the life 
method or guiding line of the individual. Their purpose 
is to bring about a change of the situation in favor of 
the individual (Adler, 1956, page 227). 
Similarly, consciousness is a Iso understood in Adler's 
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theory in terms of its function as a "special device of the 
psyche." 
The biological significance of consciousness as well as 
unconsciousness rests in the fact that these states 
enable action according to a self-consistently oriented 
life plan...Even consciousness is merely a device of 
the psyche... Thus every conscious manifestation of the 
psyche points to the unconscious, fictional, final 
goal, just as does the unconscious striving, in so far 
as one comprehends it rightly. The frequent antithesis 
of conscious and unconscious impulses is an antithesis 
of means only, but irrelevant for the final purpose of 
enchancing the self. (Adler in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 
1956, page 233) 
Adler explains subjectivity as that which is least 
consensual and most unique. He pictures it as a person s 
experience of the meaning of his or her own life. In the 
following extented quote Adler developes his theory of 
subjectivity: 
A goal of overcoming as an abstract formulation is 
unacceptable to the human mind. We need a much more 
Thus each individual arrives at concrete formulation. 
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a concrete goal of overcoming through his creative 
power, which is identical with the self. As soon as we 
speak of goal striving, when we comprehend the concrete 
goal-concept better, an immense difficulty appears, 
namely that we are dealing with thousands of 
variations, always with a unique case, with a unique 
concrete setting of the goal. 
The dynamic value of mental, emotional, and attitudinal 
movements consists of their direction toward, or 
determination by, a goal which has for the individual 
the meaning of securing for him what he regards as his 
position in life. Only in this way can we understand 
these goal-directed movements: as the individual's 
efforts to secure for himself what he interprets, or 
misinterprets as success, or as his way of overcoming a 
minus-situation in order to attain a plus-position. 
The goal of superiority with each individual is 
personal and unique. It depends on the meaning he gives 
to life. The meaning is not a matter of words. It is 
built up in his style of life and runs through it like 
a strange melody of his own creation. (Adler, 1956, p. 
180-181) 
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Finally, subjectivity as a whole is purposeful. Every 
interaction with the world supports or challenges the 
private logic. But every subjective processes, every thought 
and feeling, tends to support and maintain the private 
logic. The Adlerian way of characterizing this homeostatic 
tendency is to refer to imaginary end point of this 
striving, a "Fictional Final Goal." 
The Adlerian, Bernard Shulman defines Fictional Final Goal 
this way: 
The Life Style, which we have also called the "Unique 
Law of Movement" is always movement toward the goal; 
yet, the goal itself is the nexus of the Life Style. 
The pattern swirls around it and tends toward it. The 
Life Style is organized around the goal and this 
concept leads to the Adlerian concpet of "Unity of 
Personality." The goal itself is the unifier, the 
pattern is the organization of the uniting process. 
(Shulman, 1973a, page 24) 
And Shulman, in presenting this definition, offers this from 
Adler: 
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The goal of the mental life becomes its governing 
principle, its causa finalis. Here we have the root of 
the unity of the personality, of the indiviudality. It 
does not matter what the source of its energies may 
have been. Not their origin but their end, their 
ultimate goal, constitutes their individual character." 
(Adler, in Shulman, 1973a, page 24) 
Varela did discuss an idea like fictional final goal, a 
subjective orientation that is closed to the world but also 
determines action in the world. He used an analogy developed 
by Maturana of an airplane landing on instruments. Onlookers 
would say, "What a fine landing." But the pilot would say, 
"I know nothing of the landing. I only moved certain 
controls so as to coordinate certain readings on my 
instruments (quoted in Varela, 1978, page 250). The airplane 
proceeds as if it were pointed in a certain direction, its 
fictional final goal, which in the case of a successful 
landing, happens to correspond to the world outside of the 
airplane. 
The presupposition that all subjectivity, all behavior, 
thoughts, feelings and sensitivities sustain the life style 
orientation and reflect the basic coherence has produced 
some powerful assessment tools for Adlerians. Adler noted 
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that a person's earliest recollections, because they 
represent a person's selection from millions of possible 
moments to save and savor can be interpreted for themes of 
that coherence. (Mosak, 1977) 
Dreikurs used the assumption of coherence to develop an 
assessment technique called "two points on a line." (Terner 
and Pew, 1978). If a clinician took two apparently 
contradictory bits of behavior and sifted them for a 
unifying theme, the theme revealed would be a basic one. 
Take for an example, the behaviors of a young girl in school 
who,, in one class is her teacher's favorite, in another 
class is leader in a project and, in yet another class, is a 
terrible distracter from the lesson plan. In all instances 
she has achieved a certain amount of special attention. "To 
always get special attention," then, is the formulation 
Adlerians would use to tentatively characterize her 
fictional final goal. Further, if there were circumstances 
in which she did not achieve her goal, we would expect her 
to create compensatory excuses for herself. We would expect 
her to spontaneously justify her subjective sense of failure 
by saying something like," If I had more expensive 
clothes..." 
In Adlerian terms, all life processes, including 
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subjectivity, are organized in terms of an individual's 
striving toward his or her fictional final goal, in the PBA, 
all cognition and all subjective processes occur as 
compensation for perturbance in the direction of maintaining 
principles. These are equivalent concepts. 
Part two: A Refinement in Adlerian Theory. 
At this point in our survey of the Individual Psychology of 
Alfred Adler we will find that the principles of biological 
autonomy suggest a specific refinement. 
#6. Structural Coupling: The flexibility of a life form is 
limited by the more enduring patterns of relationship it 
establishes with its environment. 
# 7: Higher order autonomous unities: the enduring 
relationships between living forms tend to acquire live and 
form of their own encompassing, informing and ennobling the 
lives of the components. 
We will compare the concept of structural coupling to 
Adler's concept of gemeinschaftsgefuhl or social interest. 
There is no well developed Adlerian equivalent to "higher 
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order autonomous unities." The idea of "family life style" 
had been proposed by Danica Deutsch but not developed. It 
will be referred to in the discussion below. 
Structural coupling is the process by which higher order 
autonomous unities are created. It is the stuff of 
ecologies. The rabbit and fox population, for example, are 
structurally coupled. A marriage is a kind of structural 
coupling. Structural coupling is a strict way of saying 
"co-operation." It occurs whenever two autonomous systems 
modify their style of operation so that, instead of merely 
operating, they are co-operating. They form a higher order 
autonomous unity while each simultaneously preserves 
individual autonomy. 
The nearest Adlerian equivalent to structural coupling is 
the concept of "Social Interest" or "Gemeinschaftsgefuhl. ” 
"Social Interest" is the preferred English translation of 
"Gemeinschaftsgefuhl." Other translations used are "Social 
Feeling" and "Community Feeling," (Adler, 1956). 
Social interest is a complex idea in its own right and needs 
to be defined first in its own terms. We will start with the 
original German term, "Gemeinschaftsgefuhl." The cognate 
words of "gemeinschaftsgefuhl" directly suggest the 
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refinement we will propose in Adlerian theory. "Gefuhl" 
translates as "a feeling for," or " a responsiveness to." 
"Gemeinschaft" translates as "community," in the sense of 
"tribe." Therefore, a feeling for, or a rapport, with the 
community of which one is a contributing part is 
Gemeinschaftsgefuhl. The "Gemeinschaft," meaning the 
community or the system or that which is the object of those 
feelings of rapport, is not yet a separate concept in 
Adlerian theory. We propose that it become one. 
The difference between Gemeinschaftsgefuhl and structural 
coupling is a difference in precision. Structural coupling 
can refer to the specific co-operators which co-participate 
to form a specific higher order autonomous unity. In 
contrast, "Gemeinschaftsgefuhl," tends to be a measure of 
the extent to which an individual is coupled with the entire 
human gemeinschaft under the aspect of all time (Adler, 
1956). It seems to be limited only to that very broad usage. 
One could criticize the concept of Gemeinschaftsgefuhl by 
simply paraphasing Adler's comment about the abstract nature 
of the "goal of overcoming," quoted above in the section on 
subjectivity: 
The idea of feeling for the whole of human kind for all 
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time is unacceptable to the human mind. We need a much 
more concrete formulation.... how each individual 
acquires a feeling for the requirements of the specific 
situation of which he is a part....As soon as we speak 
of feeling for the human community, an immense 
difficulty appears, namely that we are dealing with 
thousands of variations, always with a unique case, 
with a unique concrete setting. 
By Adler s own standard, Gemeinschaftsgefuhl is unwieldy and 
something is needed to capture the "unique concrete setting" 
of each case. 
We would propose that the problem is remedied by making 
"Gemeinschaft" a term in itself, such that in each situation 
there is a concrete Gemeinschaft to which 
Gemeinschaftsgefuhl refers. "Gemeinschaft" would be the 
Adlerian equivalent of what Varela calls a "higher order 
autonomous system," a system formed by the coupling of 
component autonomous sytems, with an organization, structure 
and cognitive realm. Under this modification of Adlerian 
theory, the assessment of gemeinschaftgefuhl in any life 
style would be an assessment of the relationship between an 
individual's striving for self-fulIfillment and the needs of 
the various specific communities to which that individual is 
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a contributing part. 
Adler himself used "Gemeinschaft" to describe biological 
systems. Adler wrote that "the individual becomes a 
self-consistent Gemeinschaft in which all parts cooperate 
for a similar purpose." He also referred to the 
Gemeinschaft of the cells" in the body (Ansbacher, 1980). 
Gemeinschaft, would be a concept which meets Bateson's 
preliminary list of criteria for a "Mind", among which were 
the requirement that it be an aggragate of interacting 
parts, triggered by aesthetic criteria, getting "energy" 
from collateral sources, circular patterns of 
determination.(Bateson, 1979, p. 102). 
#8: Operational and functional explanations: the 
complementary patterns of observation described in the 
principles of biological autonomy should also be reflected 
in the ways we organize our thoughts, in terms of 
operational explanations to explain autonomy processes and 
in terms of functional explanations to explain interactions. 
With the separate term, Gemeinschaft, it is now possible for 
Adlerian formulations to reflect the dual perspective 
inherent in the way we observe autonomous systems. 
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By proposing this elaboration of "life style" into the dual 
perspective view of * = life style/ Gemeinschaft, we would 
be giving Adlerian theory a way of specifying levels of 
system. Each system shows a "style" when considered in its 
relationship to the encompassing Gemeinschaft. Each system 
is a Gemeinschaft composed of components/ each of which 
operates with a characteristic and purposeful style. 
"Style" and "Gemeinschaft" will refer to separate domains of 
observation. For an analogy, think of the difference between 
the United States as a homeland (Gemeinschaft) and the 
United States as a member of the international community of 
nations (Style). The same autonomous entity but two very 
different ways of understanding and characterizing it. 
There is already within Adlerian literature a sense of 
complementary ways to look at interaction and cooperation. 
Consider Adler's definition of a marriage: 
It can easily be shown that love and marriage are one 
side of cooperation -- not a cooperation for the 
welfare of two persons only, but a cooperation also for 
the welfare of mankind." (Adler, 1958, page 263) 
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Here Adler is insisting that a higher order unity exists, 
the marriage itself. Furthermore, he suggests that there is 
a relationship between marriage as a whole and the even 
larger community and that relationship is also characterized 
by the style-related consideration of more or less social 
interest. 
The idea that a marriage may have a style was advanced by 
the New York Adlerian Danica Deutsch in 1961. She proposed a 
family life style. Here is how Deutsch describes "Family 
Life Style": 
It was in the course of my work with family groups that 
I initially became aware of a family life style, 
comparable to Adler's concept of the individual life 
style. By meeting with the family as a unit we are 
able to perceive the family gestalt in vivo, while 
the individual life styles of the family members are 
sometimes visible in statui nascendi. (Deutsch, 1962) 
The strongest example, however, of the Adlerian analysis of 
Gemeinschaft as a Gemeinschaft is in the Adlerian practice 
of the assessment of the family constellation. (Shulman, 
1973b) In this practice, a written description of the style 
of an individual is developed, for clinical purposes, by 
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inquiring into a person's memories of himself in his family 
in his formative years. The information gathered is 
summarized by the clinician who tries to include both the 
subjective view of the client as well as the clinician's 
interpretation of what actually happened based on the 
overall pattern. The clinician's guess about the overall 
pattern is a guess about the nature of a Gemeinschaft, in 
this case, the family, to which an individual contributes 
and in relationship to which an individual defines his 
"self.” The elements of the family Gemeinschaft to which 
Adlerians are sensitive include the pervasive values in the 
family, the emotional atmosphere of the family, the sibling 
interrelationships, ordinal positions of siblings, guiding 
lines for masculinity and femininity, parental favoritism, 
parental models, and models of cooperation. (Mosak and 
Shulman, 1977) Shulman has pointed out that, using these 
sensitivities, Adlerians have done family therapy for years 
but never written about it (Shulman, personal communication, 
1980) . 
What I have hoped to suggest here is a small shift in the 
definition system of Adler's Individual Psychology: the 
addition of the concept of gemeinschaft and the linking of 
that concept into a complementarity with the concept of life 
This shift introduces the idea of levels into the style. 
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Adlerian framework, and with that allows for a more precise 
definition of pathology. 
The implications of this change will be the topic of the 
next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIFE-STYLE/GEMEINSCHAFT COMPLEMENTARITY. 
Introduction. 
In this chapter we will explore some of the implications the 
Life Style/ Gemeinschaft complementarity as they relate to 
the Adlerian theory of Pathology. We will suggest a way to 
define pathology using complementary perspectives and we 
will develop such a model. For one half of the 
complementarity we will use the Dreikurs "Four Goals of 
Misbehavior" model. For the other half we will use a new 
model called "Four Stages of Deterioration of Cooperation." 
Pathology 
Neurotic behavior, as currently defined in the Adlerian 
model, is behavior that fails to win cooperation. People who 
behave neurotically are said to be deficient in social 
interest. Neurotic behavior is said to be the selfish and 
desparate behavior of disheartened individuals who are 
trying to establish their identity in a world which is 
against them. Their behaviors show a lack of sensitivity, 
even a hostility, for the system of which they are a part. 
69 
In Adler's own words: 
All mistaken answers to the tasks of life are...the 
attempts of more or less discouraged people to solve 
their life-problems without the use of cooperation or 
social interest. ( Adler, in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 
1956, page 299) 
This is clear as far as it goes, but in the elaboration and 
application of the concept, it is necessary to identify the 
system of which the people behaving neurotically are a part. 
It is a particular system which declares the behavior of 
its member to be pathological. It is the opinion of the 
particular system that the intentions of the "pathological" 
member are toxic. 
Whether or not any behavior has sufficient social interest 
is not necessarily a judgement made by a clinician, but it 
certainly is a judgement made by the living context for that 
behavior. The phenomenon of pathology, the occurance of 
behavior said to be informed by insufficient social interest 
involves more than just individual behavior, it also 
involves the opinion and the response consequent on that 
opinion on the part of a Gemeinschaft. 
There are evident connections between the new ideas advanced 
here and the PBA. Social interest, the lack of which is said 
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to be the measure of pathological intention, is a kind of 
structural coupling. Structural coupling is a relationship 
between systems that form higher order systems. Pathological 
behavior, behavior informed by insufficient social interest, 
is a process that tends to be —to coin a new term for PBA 
— structurally uncoupling, tending toward the 
dis-integration of the higher order composite unity. 
Structural coupling is a manner of relationship. Therefore, 
it is not enough to speak only of the pathological intent of 
the identified patient(s) in a system. In a pathological 
situation other parts of the composite system (acting as 
normal to preserve themselves and the whole) work against 
the compensations of the "pathological components" to 
produce a counter-pathological movement — which is also 
part of the pathology. When this happens, the compensation 
for perturbation of all parts— a process necessary for 
survival of the system and its components — makes the 
perturbation worse. This is a similar idea to one proposed 
by the MRI Brief Therapy School (Watzlawick, Weakland, 
Fisch, 1974): the problem is a mistaken solution strategy. 
Here is how this definition of pathology appears in strict 
Adlerian vocabulary. Notice how it addresses only the 
intentions of the "pathological" component, but also how it 
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describes a pattern of compensation for perturbance. 
[Adler] posited that the goal of success pulls the 
individual forward toward mastery and the overcoming of 
obstacles. He observed that, for socially- interested 
individuals, the goal of superiority is on the useful 
side of life and contributes to the developing human 
community. He further described his observation of the 
discouraged person who, operating on the useless side 
of life under the burden of increased feelings of 
inferiority, makes the error of supposing that (since 
he feels inferior to others) his task is to attain a 
position of superiority over them. Since this 
movement only invites the antagonism of others, it 
contributes to his further defeat and creates a 
disturbance in the life of the community. The 
discouraged person may express his superiority striving 
in self-elevation, depreciation of others, and 
self-aggrandizement, countering his immense feelings of 
inferiority with a pattern of compensatory pretenses to 
superiority which may be termed a "superiority 
complex." (Griffith and Powers, 1984, p.22) 
The description fits the situation of someone caught in a 
pathological system. The judgement as to whether behavior is 
socially interested or not originates in the encompassing 
context for the behavior. Even though counter-pressure comes 
from the environment, the source of responsibility for the 
behavior is the individual. If behavior undesirable to the 
community is still forced on the community inviting 
antagonism, then the individual initiating the behavior is 
said to be wrong to persist. (Dreikurs, 1953, p. 8) 
The new model to be proposed is an expanded Adlerian view of 
pathology which encompasses the traditional Adlerian view. 
The original view considered only the style of the 
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Par^^c^-Pan^s • although it implied the values of then 
encompassing Gemeinschaft. This new view specifies both the 
role of internal actions of the higher order composite 
unity, or Gemeinschaft, in defining pathology, as well as 
the interactional styles of the component unities. 
This new way of looking at pathology involves a new kind of 
complementarity. The kind of complementarity we have spoken 
of here-to-fore identified the relationship between inside 
and outside of one autonomous unity, as for example, the 
relationship between the domestic affairs of the United 
States and the international style, or, to use a more 
intimate example, the relationship between the internal 
relationships of a family and the style of the family in its 
community (or in its extended family.) This additional kind 
complementarity is an inside-out version, or the previous 
one, so to speak. It describes the relationship between 
stylistic, i.e., purposeful, movement of autonomous 
components and the whole which they from when as they come 
together. It is "the Governor's Conference" perspective, the 
relationship betweeen all of the States, as autonomous 
unities and the Country as a whole. 
Here is the proposed new Adlerian, complementary definition 
of pathology: 
73 
From the perspective of the interests of the whole, 
pathology is a threatened breakdown or strain in the 
cooperation of the components. From the perspective of the 
interests of the parts, pathology is the weaken ability of 
any part to maintain itself while also contributing to the 
whole. 
Here are some of the corollaries: 
1) The actions of every autonomous creature (individual, 
couple, family, etc.) are always in the direction of 
self-maintenance and actualization. 
2) These actions may or may not contribute to the 
maintenance and actualization of the higher order autonomous 
creature of which it is a part. 
3) The requirements of the Gemeinschaft will put pressure 
on the components to modify their behavior so that the 
Gemeinschaft may continue to realize its higher order self. 
4) One particular kind of pressure used in human affairs is 
moral pressure. The declaration from one part of the 
gemeinschaft that pathology is lodged in another is also a 
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sign of pathology in the whole gemeinschaft. 
In the next part of the chapter we will construct a model 
using these complementary senses of pathology. 
The "Four Goals" Model: The Functional Explanations. 
Dreikurs1 invented a model of psychological assessment 
called "The Four Goals of Misbehavior" (Dreikurs, 1967b) in 
order to teach people to see purposiveness, intelligence and 
intentionality in children's misbehavior. He claimed that 
the four goals could be found in Adler's writing and that he 
simply organized them into a model.. (Terner and Pew, page 
157) The model has become widely popular, a testimony to its 
usefulness. 
In the Four Goals model, all emphasis is on individual 
goals. Yet even as Dreikurs elaborates his model we can see 
him evoking the complementary perspective, an operational 
explanation combining the actions of the participants into a 
pattern that describes a whole. 
Let us review Dreikurs' presentation of his own model of 
functional explanations (attributions of purpose) with a 
sensitivity for the implied operational explanations 
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(patterns of events), in the following extended quote 
Dreikurs introduces his model in the first paragraph, in the 
second paragraph he discusses the model as though the locus 
of control were the child, not the parent. However, by the 
end of the third paragraph he has come to distributing 
responsibility equally between parent and child. As you read 
these paragraphs you can, perhaps, see, as in a shadow, the 
complementary model I will propose later. Finally, and 
parenthetically, those readers familiar with systems theory 
will note that this surprisingly contemporary analysis of 
interactions was written in 1959 from a model first 
published in 19401 (Terner and Pew, page 156, note #23) 
Here is Dreikurs own description of the "four goals" model 
of disturbing behavior in children: 
The accuracy of the communication which exists between 
a misbehaving child and the adult is startling. We can 
distinguish four goals of a disturbing or deficient 
normal child. Every child tries to belong; but if he 
becomes discouraged, as all our children do, he 
develops wrong ideas about his possibilities to find 
his place. Then he (1) either tries to get attention 
and service, finding his place through what he can get; 
or, (2) he tries to demonstrate his own power if the 
parents attempt to stop forcefully his demand for 
attention. If he feels completely beaten down and 
disliked, then he may try (3) to get even, to hurt as 
he feels hurt, as his only means to make himself count. 
If he is utterly discouraged and expects nothing but 
failure, then he (4) may flaunt real or assumed 
deficiences in order to be left alone, thereby avoiding 
more painful evidence of his worthlessness. 
The children are not aware of the purpose in their 
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misbehavior; nevertheless they are very systematic in 
achieving their end. The adults are also completely 
unaware, in most cases, of the child's purpose in 
misbehaving, and consequently succumb to the child's 
provocation. The child does not appeal to their logic, 
but to their emotions; and this appeal is usually done 
skillfully and effectively. It is the evoked emotion in 
the adult which corresponds to the child's goal and 
makes the adult such an easy victim. When the parent 
feels annoyed, he is inclined to communicate this 
annoyance either by scolding, advising, admonishing, or 
coaxing. Little does he realize that in doing so, he is 
merely following the child's direction and demands, 
namely to give special attention. On the other hand, 
when the parent is provoked, feeling that he cannot let 
the child "do that to him," then he not only invites 
the child to show him that he can, but also becomes 
inveigled in a power contest in which the child is 
usually not the loser. 
When the parent feels deeply hurt and cannot understand 
how anyone could be so mean, then he only responds to 
the child's intentions, namely to be hurt. And, as a 
rule, he retaliates and therby provokes the child to 
hurt even further. And when the adult, parent or 
teacher, feels like throwing up his arms in despair 
because he does not know what to do with the child, 
then he merely responds to the child's desire to be 
left alone. Many children convince the adults that they 
are incapable, and induce them to treat them in such a 
way that both become more convinced of their inability. 
Each relationship is a closed system, in which the 
responses to one stimulus are the stimuli to the next 
response of the same kind. There is no corrective 
feedback possible since both parties have agreed on the 
premises of their interaction, on the purpose of each 
individual act, fitting into the pattern of their 
definite, although unconscious, agreement. (Dreikurs, 
1967, page 274-275) 
There are four categories of intentions: attention, power, 
revenge and what Dreikurs called "assumed disability." The 
diagnostic indicators are the feelings of the adults and the 
response of the children when the adult responds initially. 
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Dreikurs says that each relationship is a closed system. In 
the next section we will examine the same four categories of 
intentions and behaviors as though each pattern created a 
system. 
Four stages in the deterioration of cooperation: 
The operational explanations. 
In the following paragraphs we will describe the 
complementary model implied by the original model. We will 
work with the following theoretical complementarities: 
1. To consider individual's style only is to conclude that 
pathology is a failing in social interest or 
gemeinschaftsgefuhl; to consider the organization of the 
whole is to conclude that pathology is a strain in the 
cooperative fabric of the gemeinschaft. 
2. For the individual, the greater the discouragement the 
more desparate the compensatory striving for belongingness; 
for the whole, the greater the strain in the gemeinschaft 
the more constrained and limited participants must become in 
respect to other ways of contributing and the more narrowly 
and rigidly their striving must be directed toward 
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remediating the strain and maintaining the whole. 
3. For the individual, the more desparate the compensatory 
striving the more rigidly the focus on difficult, 
inappropriate, and unrealizable concrete goals. For the 
whole, the more desparate the strain the more the 
participants become pre-occupied with each other and the 
less capable they are of cooperating to accomplish the tasks 
set by life for the whole. The system as a whole tightens 
down, becomes pathological and is less able to contribute to 
the larger gemeinschaft of which it is a part. An example of 
this is Adler's favorite metaphor for marriages. 
Adler tells the story of an old village ritual in which a 
to-be-married couple are asked to cut a log in half using a 
two-handed saw. Only if they cooperate equally can they 
succeed. If one tries to dominate, the saw will bind. If 
one tries to give less than equal work, the log won't be 
cut. One point of the analogy is that when cooperation 
breaks down in a family, the family itself can become a 
drain on the community. 
4. As progressively more patterns of interaction are caught 
up in the various kinds of dis-cooperation less of the 
system is able to be involved in positive cooperation. 
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Therefore, one could also conceptualize the deterioriation 
of cooperation as growing area of dis-cooperation, growing 
like a malignancy, within a system. 
The complex implications of these idea will be explored in 
the next chapter, but first let us describe the 
complementary model. 
The four stages of deterioration of 
cooperation in a Gemeinschaft. 
Stage zero: Gemeinschaftgefuhl. 
This stage, numbered "zero," doesn't count. There is nothing 
remarkable about it as far as pathology is concerned. All 
participants are cooperating. Attention is focused on the 
needs of the whole. The needs of the various individual 
selves and the coherency of the whole is being maintained 
"automatically" through non-conscious action. 
Stage One; "Attention" or "Distraction." 
This is the first shift in the deterioration of cohension 
and community- mindedness. It is the beginning of the shift 
in the component's style toward self-centeredness and the 
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first challenge to system level cooperation. It is the 
emergence of dichotomous thinking: "me or them." in the 
"Four Goals" model this shift occurs when a child wants to 
distract a parent's attention away from the task at hand and 
towards his or her more personal needs. In the 
"Gemeinschaft" Model it occurs when there is a disagreement 
about next steps. 
People momentarily remove their attention from a common task 
and attend to each other. The diagnostic sign of attention 
getting behavior in children is a feeling on the part of the 
adult of annoyance. If one looks at this transaction 
considering the interests of the Gemeinschaft as a whole, it 
appears that the members are vaguely disagreeing about what 
they, as a team, are going to allow to happen next. 
In the Four Goals model, attention changing negotiations are 
initiated by children against parents. When the Four Goals 
model is put into complementarity with the Four Stages 
model, these attention changing negotiations can be launched 
by any part at any time. For example, a parent asks a 
child a question and the child changes the subject. This 
behavior is an attention changing transaction, also part of 
stage one phenomena. 
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A simple example can be found in most conversations. Most 
conversations are constantly tended in quite, unobtrusive 
ways. People make decisions about when to talk and when to 
listen and so on. However, if someone is unhappy about the 
flow of conversation they can interrupt by saying something 
like, That s not what I meant," or "Would you repeat that?" 
These comments signal a shift from an inobtrusive tending of 
the relationship to an insistance on conscious, intentional 
tending, or "attending." This shift to "attending" is an 
example of the most early stage of deterioration of 
cooperation. 
It is important to not that a stage one shift is not in ' 
itself inherently pathological. Such corrective adjustments 
are made constantly in everyday life. What may be 
pathological is the inability of the system to make the 
correction successfully, as when, say, an automatic 
transmission gets stuck in a lower gear. The process itself 
may sound like a small thing but people caught in neurotic 
transactions work in it constantly and, for participants, 
the constant tending to each other is tiresome. 
Stage Two: "Power" or "Confrontation." 
When the simple request for attention and special 
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consideration does not produce results, the request is 
escalated a demand. Stage Two is a disagreement over who has 
the power to settle the disagreements of Stage one. The 
question of "how can we resolve this?" fades and the 
antithetical mode of apperception Adler spoke of — "You or 
me" as opposed to "we" — comes to the fore. The 
problem-solving resources of the participants become 
pre—occupied with questions of win or lose, your way or 
mine, superiority versus inferiority and, quite often, 
masculinity versus feminity. 
The division that forms at this stage is the division 
between the needs of the individuals separately, on the one- 
hand and the needs of the group as a whole, on the other. 
The participants fight because they believe the only 
alternative is to give in. They can not quit because the 
needs of the whole will not let them quit. As they fight 
they ransom the needs the the whole to press their own 
demands which they believe to be paramount. 
The difference between a pathological confrontation and a 
healthy one, according to basic Adlerian theory, is the 
presence or absence of discouragement. When participants are 
discouraged, the confrontation loses the quality of being a 
fight between opponents loyal to a common cause. In so far 
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as the fight is understood as one between loyal opponents 
there is no discouragement and no pathology. The 
pathological power struggle is marked by distrust, again 
there is that stuck in a lower gear quality. 
Stage Three: "Abuse” or "Retribution." 
When the assumption of good faith and the belief in the 
worthiness of the opponents is dropped, when appeal to 
mutual interest is weakened, the fight becomes personalized. 
When the opponents suspect disloyalty in each other to the 
common cause they demand retribution in the name of that 
common cause. They abuse each other in the name of justice. 
The individuals in an abusive transaction are discouraged 
and retaliating actively (or retaliating passively by giving 
misleading pretenses to cooperation.) The individual shows 
what Adler called "a hestitation because of fear of defeat" 
(Griffith and Powers, 1984). 
Questions of integrity are even more heightened in Stage 
Three. Inevitably, if I (or anyone) lose a power struggle 
and I feel forced to contribute to a project that violates 
my integrity I feel pain, injury, and insult. If I cannot 
leave the field and I am being abused, I will find some way 
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to retaliate. 
The test of transactions at this level is pain and attack, 
although these signs are sometimes carefully hidden. To 
understand the attacks at this level, it is important to 
consider the overriding value system of the Gemeinschaft, 
which is still operative, and which, as a context, 
determines and defines the weapons. One example comes to 
mind of a family which had invested itself heavily in 
religion. When the son hurt the father by saying things 
about him at school, the father retaliated by praying for 
the son in Church. While the father couldn't actually damn 
his son, he could declare his son damned and in need of 
help. 
Stage Four: Reciprocal Rejection. 
Reciprocal Rejection is close to death for the Gemeinschaft. 
It is essentially a pretense of relationship. It is the 
very least interaction that can be comfortably born between 
interactants; consequently it is very intense and exhausting 
at points of contact. It is like Cold War. For each party, 
to open up for more interaction is to open up for personal 
attacks. Rejection is a mode of coping that seems to be a 
better alternative than damaging and exhausting retaliation. 
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Indicators are negative spaces, the feelings, thoughts and 
attitudes that are not there but should be there, and the 
numbness and exhaustion that a comes from keeping strong 
feelings at bay. There are also intermittent flashes of 
great intensity and pain. 
Examples of this sort of transaction abound. Divorce is a 
good example. So also is the "divorce" that happens between 
parents and minor children, the turning over of custody to 
State agencies. The relationship between a scapegoat and the 
originating community is probably also an example. Finally, 
probably many of the forms of what is called "cut-off" in 
the Bowen model of family therapy (Bowen, 1978) are examples 
of Stage Four. 
The term, "Rejection," does not appear in Dreikur's 
individual model of the four goals. In his model Dreikurs 
defined Stage Four as "assumed disability," or "assumed 
inadequacy." His theory was that the child assumed a 
pretense of being inadequate so he or she would be left 
alone. The child was said to be so discouraged that she 
didn't want to be included or asked to try something that 
would only end in failure. 
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The term/ rejection," would seem to me to capture that 
intention more clearly, although it would not imply a 
specific mechanism, as does Dreikurs' term. Possibly assumed 
inadequacy is the only way a child, helpless to live on her 
own, can reject a parent — by forcing the parent to reject 
her. Adults and teens have many other ways to achieve 
rejection, not the least of which is to appear undesireable. 
Conclusion 
The Stages and Goals model provides a map of progressive 
stages of pathology. It does so in a way that assumes that 
"pathological," or non-cooperative behavior is a 
contribution to a general interactional and pathological 
logic. How this model may be used is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
HOW THE STAGES AND GOALS MODEL MAY BE USED. 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will review ways to use the Stages and 
Goals model to explain systemic interaction. We will 
describe how, according to the model, systems define their 
own boundaries and how the clinician can define a system to 
be worked with in a way that respects that self-definition. 
We will describe how the clinician positions himself in 
relationship to the system being worked with. We will also 
describe how the clinician can use this model to create maps 
of interactive patterns within the systems being considered. 
Finally, we will examine how the model can be used to help 
devise an intervention. We will start with how systems 
define their own boundaries. 
The Pathological System: The Protesting System. 
The PBA describes how areas of autonomy emerge by their own 
designing as part of a general ecological process. It is a 
theory of self—separating realms in an otherwise 
interconnected ecology. Pathological systems also declare 
and define themselves. Furthermore, pathological systems 
structure themselves in ways that reflect the nature of 
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pathology. 
The idea of pathology as "self-declared" is a dimension of 
Adlerian theory. In Adlerian theory, symptoms are understood 
as "strengthened devices to fullfill an inner demand." 
"Strengthened devices" means that the normal devices humans 
use to transact with Life are exaggerated. A symptom is a 
sign that someone is working harder than normal to 
accomplish something. Along these same lines, Adlerian 
theory describes the "Neuroses" (meaning, in a particular 
unified usage, all forms of mental disturbance and criminal 
behavior) as a form of protest. (Adler, 1956) . To protest 
something is to take a position with such emphasis that 
others are forced into interaction along the terms of that 
position. 
In the complementarity of the Stages and Goals Model, 
situations of "pathology" emerge as a form of protest and 
counter-protest, and as a strain in the cooperative 
community. When a component of a system begins to emphasize 
its own identity over and against the requirements of other 
components, or of the whole — at least, when that is so in 
the opinion held by parts of the system — then the system 
begins to work against itself. There is no telling which 
action is protest and which is counter-protest in this 
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model. All that is said is that, when protest and 
counter-protest occur, there is a strain in cooperation and 
diminution of productivity. 
Since there is no telling how something gets started, 
situations of pathology are said to "emerge." In this Stages 
and Goals Model, pathology emerges in stages as levels of 
protest build on each other and call more attention to 
themselves. Pathology is more "emerged" as more "intentional 
consciousness," that particular "strengthened device" of the 
psyche meant to solve problems, becomes more and more 
pre-occupied with the methods of protest and less occupied 
with the issues of protest. Pathology is what happens when 
a problem begins to compound rather than resolve. 
Psychopathology is the complex of extraneous problems which 
interfere with the solution of the basic problems of human 
social living. This complex of extra problems, in the manner 
of a clamor about a protest about a protest, announces 
itself in the general consciousness and thereby defines and 
declares a particular kind a system, one in which 
cooperation toward communal tasks has broken down. Rather 
than call it a "Pathological system," we would suggest the 
less evaluative and more descriptive term, the "Protesting 
system." A protesting system is one that has the effect of 
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calling attention to itself on the grounds that it isn't 
working to its own satisfaction. It is a system whose method 
of compensation for perturbance presses demands on its 
context that are interpreted as being excessive. The 
protesting system includes everyone who assumes an attitude 
toward or against the core issues or the methods of protest 
and does so in such a way that their own attitude feeds back 
into the protesting system. 
The "Relevant" System: The Clinical System. 
It is generally agreed that systems based therapy is not 
defined by who is in the consulting room but rather by how 
the therapist conceptualizes who is actively involved in the 
problem. (Haley, 1971). As an extension of this premise, 
system therapists find that the relevant system for therapy 
may often go beyond the boundaries of the nuclear family. 
Some therapists prefer a three-generation conceptualization. 
(Whittaker,1982) . Some systems theory writers have 
emphasized the role of the family in the homeostasis of 
larger systems ( Coppersmith,1983) and the role of the 
referring person in the homeostasis of the family. 
(Selvini-Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 1980a). Many 
insist that the therapist be included in the relevant 
system. (DeShazer, 1982) 
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In an idea similar, to the one to be introduced here, 
Hoffman suggested that a therapist might even want to think 
of a series of nested contexts and/or systems, each of which 
has its own characteristic set of dynamics which the 
therapist must work through, like layers of an onion, in 
order to reach the core dynamics of the family. ( Hoffman, 
1883) 
The proposal here is that the "protesting system," may or 
may not include all the members of a nuclear family and it 
may also include the nuclear family and many more besides. 
The protesting system includes everyone one who has 
"feelings" about how things should turn out. Or, to use 
Bateson's suggestion to the effect that feelings are a kind 
of principle, (Bateson, 1972b) we would say that a 
protesting system should include everyone whose involvement 
is a matter of personal or professional principle. 
Having a stake in the outcome of a problem in not 
necessarily a justification to be included in the therapy. 
The decision of whom to include is a clinical decision to be 
made on a case-by-case basis. We would distinguish the 
protesting system, meaning those engaged with problem and 
the related protests, from the clinical system, meaning 
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those with whom the therapist wants involvement. 
In forming a clinical system, the therapist is creating an 
autonomous system within a protesting system. The creation 
of a clinical system is a way of entering a protesting 
system that is simultaneously part of the protest and not 
part of the protest. When people are excluded who want to 
counter—protest, then the act of excluding them is not 
neutral. On the other hand, the act of including people and 
engaging them equally is a way of accepting contradictory 
protests simultaneously. It is, obviously, in itself, a 
unifying act. 
Considerations in Defining the Clinical System: 
Pressure Areas in the Map of Emotional Atmosphere. 
Structural models have been suggested to help a therapist 
organize his understanding of those family -and- larger 
system models. Coppersmith (1983) has suggested using the 
three triangle categories developed by Minuchin (1974). 
Hoffman (1983) suggested there are inner and outer rings to 
the presenting system and defined those rings in terms of 
roles. In the inner ring was the family alone; in the middle 
ring, the family and therapists; in the outer ring, the 
referring context. 
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One implication of the Stages and Goals Model is that there 
lines of distinction that occur spontaneously within the 
protesting system that can be used as structural guidelines. 
Rings may be defined according to the quality and intensity 
of the protest. At low levels, the intention of protest is 
to control how conscious attention will be directed. When 
disagreement becomes a power struggle, the principle issue 
is compounded by the question of who will have power to 
decide. If people begin to fight unfairly they can start to 
justify mutual abuse, which is yet another argument. 
Finally, in the most intense area of protest, participants 
refuse to engage and refuse to drop the issue and they 
mutually imprison each other in their terrible relationship. 
As protest spreads, it spreads first in its less intense 
forms. In the outer rings of the protesting system there are 
people who "disturbed." In the next inward ring, there are 
those who are forced to take a stand. Next comes those who 
are insulted and abused. At the core, are those in prison by 
hopelessness. 
It is easy to see how a typical difficult family 
psychological problem can be mapped. The map of members of a 
system in various levels of protest is like a weather map of 
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the system's emotional atmosphere with high and low pressure 
areas deliniated. Consider the following case: 
The presenting problem was Mom's drinking. The first 
person to show up for therapy was the daughter. In the 
following session the daughter brought the father in 
and he showed the therapist a date book in which he 
kept track of his wife's drinking. 
After ten or so hours work with various family members, 
including Mom, the following picture of the family 
system emerged: 
Mother and Father were at the core of a family system 
in mutual rejection. Father spent his time in the 
basement workshop "puttering," but really rejecting his 
wife's company. She sat at the kitchen table and drank. 
He kept track of her drinking. When they did talk they 
verbally abused each other. 
The next circle of protest, abuse, included the teenage 
daughter as well as the two parents. The daughter tried 
to rescue her father from her mother's drinking by 
emotionally abusing her mother, calling her names, 
95 
saying "I hate you." When this happened, the father 
withdrew from both of them and started chain smoking 
which threatened his own precarious health and 
frightened the mother and daughter. 
The next circle, power struggles, included the teenage 
son. The son was very angry with the daughter for being 
so hurtful, as he saw it, to the mother. The son would 
argue with the daughter but not around the parents, 
because he didn't want to upset them even more. 
Finally, in the outer ring of protest, attention, were 
the two M.D.'s treating the mother and father for 
depression and back pain. They were both terribly 
worried about the emotional problems in the family. One 
was prescribing Valium for the mother, the other was 
recommending that the father get the mother to a 
therapist and go to one for himself as well. 
Although the presenting problem was mother's drinking, 
the therapist took the time to examine the family 
system before setting up a treatment plan. An important 
question was whether the system was being organized by 
an alcoholic addiction or whether the alcohol was in 
the service of a goal. A ten session limit was to 
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determine whether family interventions could stop the 
drinking. 
Treatment involved getting parents to come in 
separately at first, de—toxifying their mutual 
rejection. Then, the parents were seen together. The 
point in the treatment involved seeing mother 
and daughter alone and separating the daughter's issues 
with mom from dad's issues with mom. When daughter 
apologized to Mom and the two of them began spending 
time together Dad came out of hiding. Dad could stay in 
the basement only if he had Mom imprisoned by his 
rejection at the kitchen table. 
Therapist Positioning: Defining the Clinical System. 
Protest has the purpose of eliminating neutral turf and 
involving those who don't wish to be involved. It is the 
intended nature of protest that it is difficult for one to 
ignore, submit to, be unhurt or un-insulted by, or to 
withdraw from without becoming trapped. 
It is the therapist's job to establish a realm within the 
protesting system in which, for a time, there can be neutral 
turf. The protest is entrusted to the therapist and the 
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therapist manages the protest by seeing that people in the 
session are not ignored, overpowered, hurt, or imprisoned. 
The therapist's ability to do this is, through the constant 
monitoring, control, and manipulation of his or her 
relationship to 1) the participants, 2) the system as a 
whole and 3) the excluded protesters. 
Where to place this boundary between protesting system and 
system is, I suspect, a matter of taste amoung 
therapists. Some negotiate it with their clients. Others 
simply declare it. The Stages and Goals Model suggests that, 
by reading the level of protest, the therapist may be able 
to assess how hard he or she will have to work in order to 
draw a boundary at any particular point. 
For example, if the people excluded from the clinical system 
are counter- protesting at the level of rejection, to 
exclude them permanently from the therapy is to cut the 
heart out of the clinical system. If protesters at the levl 
of abuse are excluded, one can expect them to try sabotaging 
the therapy. On the other hand, if those excluded are 
protesting on the level of a power struggle, then the 
immediate subject matter of the therapy will be the fight 
between system and "outsiders". If the people excluded are 
at the level of "distraction and attention," then the 
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coaching might be in the direction of politely ignoring. For 
example, an initial issue of therapy might be how much to 
allow a mother-in-law to know about about the marital 
difficulties. 
Two additional comments can be made. It is also possible for 
the therapist for define himself as being outside of the 
clinical system by saying that the referring, i.e., 
counter-protesting, sources are wrong and that the clients 
are capable of solving their own problems for the time 
being. (Jones, 1985) Second, the most common way for a 
therapist to define a clinical system is through the 
mechanism of confidentiality. By establishing a confidential 
relationship with the client system as far as the larger, 
protesting system is concerned, the therapist avoids having 
to respond to the counter-protest against the clinical 
system. 
The therapist stands on the boundary, and by his or her 
actions and attitudes, creates that boundary. By taking an 
exclusionary attitude towards the larger protesting system, 
the therapist supports the identity of the system he or she 
joins. By lending strength at a point of protest, the 
therapist might be able to make a protest unnecessary. It 
would be interesting to know, for example, who members of a 
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family stop talking to, fighting with, being bothered by, 
when they simply enter into therapy. 
Mapping Within the Clinical System. 
In order to facilitate less protest and more cooperation 
within the system, it is important for the therapist to 
avoid unintentionally siding with one or the other faction. 
This idea is basic to all systemic models of psychotherapy. 
Sluzki in a review of systemic models summarized it this 
way: 
A stance that characterizes therapists who focus on any 
of the systemic models is one of equidistance or 
neutrality. The therapist may attain this neutral 
position either by carefully refusing to engage in any 
kind of side-taking (Selvini-Palazzoli et al., 1980b) 
or by systematically siding with all the participants, 
even those who do not wish to be sided with (Sluzki, 
1975). The end result is the same: a nonalignment that 
increases the therapist's leverage as well as his or 
her ability to perceive seemingly conflicting views 
presented by family members ( and even nonconflicting 
views) as interlocking choreographies of interactional 
patterns. (Sluzki, 1983, page 475) 
To achieve this non-alignment and lay the groundwork for 
increased cooperation, a therapist must be able to recognize 
patterns of protest and somehow avoid being entangled in 
them. There are two kinds of sensitivities needed; first, 
the ability to recognize protest from the outside; second, 
the ability to recognize the signs within oneself of having 
lost neutrality. The Stages and Goals model addresses both 
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concerns. 
The Use of the Model to Help a Therapist Keep 
Track of His or Her Position in a Family Interview: 
Moment to Moment Hypothesizing. 
The Stages and Goals model identifies the pressure areas of 
protest as a self-created distinctions within a system. 
These distinctions define disagreeing factions in an 
otherwise cooperative community. The therapist uses 
categories of feelings as clues to detect these 
distinctions. The feelings may be his or her own, as well 
as, those observed in others. In the following re-creation 
of a session feelings are used to identify pressure areas, 
areas of protest and counter-protest as they emerge in a 
session: 
A teenager comes to an initial family therapy session 
with his mother, father and younger brother. During the 
initial conversation, between the therpist and the 
mother, the boy makes several comments which soon 
distract the mother. 
(Stage one: Distraction. The mother 
and boy collude in avoiding the 
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therapist. The task, which involves 
explaining the situation to the 
therapist, breaks down. ) 
The mother turns to the boy and tells him to mind his 
manners and the boy responds with taunting sarcasm. 
(Stage Two: Confrontation. Mother 
and boy move even further from the 
task) 
The argument escalates into name calling. Therapist has 
feelings of dread and concern about keeping control of 
the session. 
(Stage Three: Abuse, involving boy 
and mother. Meanwhile, dividing 
therapist from the boy-mother team 
is the therapist's own passive 
resistance, a form of power 
struggle (Stage Two), as if they 
want him to stop the fight and he 
doesn't want to. The map now has 
two rings, an inner ring with the 
boy and the mother in stage three 
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and an outer ring in stage two, 
which includes the therapist as 
well.) 
Suddenly the mother turns back to the therapist and 
suggests foster placement. The boys says "fine with 
(Stage Three (Abuse) with threats 
of Stage Four (Mutual Rejection) 
between the boy and his mother. 
Therapist still in a Stage Two 
(Power) struggle with the two and 
resisting taking sides. Mother's 
new move invites the therapist into 
stage three. The therapist resists, 
wishing to have the two cooperate, 
at least in therapy. This wish 
places the therapist and the 
Mother-son team in confrontation.) 
The therapist, feels helpless and overpowered by the 
exchange between the two. He asks the mother a 
non-related question, does she have brothers and 
sisters that live in the area? The boy gets quiet. 
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(The therapist changes the subject. 
Goal One (Distraction) behavior on 
his part, but accepted 
cooperatively. Cooperative 
Framework restored. Talking about 
the "problem" sets up a breakdown 
between boy and mother and ignoring 
the problem makes the strain go 
away. Does this mean that the 
escalating problem between mother 
and boy is a counter-protest to a 
third party who has complaints 
about their relationship? Who else 
is hurt by this fighting? 
Other family members were quiet in 
this exchange.) 
The therapist brings up the question of foster care as 
something they both are thinking about. 
(An attempt to address the same 
issue in a cooperative framework.) 
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The mother begins speaking to the therapist of her 
profound concern for her son and her hopes that foster 
care will provide for him the care she, regretfully, 
can not provide at home. The therapist is impressed by 
the power, warmth and fullness of the mother's voice. 
As the mother shows more "love," the boy gets unusually 
quiet. He stops his distractions and becomes more 
self-absorbed. Suddenly he makes an incoherent angry 
speech to his mother and the therapist and storms out 
of the consulting room. 
(How was the mother using her 
emotions? Similarly, what are the 
boy's intentions by his outburst? 
The theory would say that the boy 
has acted in response to his 
mother. The boy's behavior at the 
end seemed to indicate a rapid 
movement down through all the 
stages of deterioration of 
cooperation, including four, 
slamming the door. He is quiet, 
then angry, then abusive, and 
finally rejecting. The theory 
insists that those states have 
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their reciprocals. We have to then 
re-examine the possible intentions 
guiding the mother's behavior. Are 
they directed toward both son and 
therapist and perhaps the other 
family members as well? All this 
would produce the following 
hypothesis: 
The mother's show of warmth and 
concern to the therapist is being 
used by her to punish her son. 
With warm feelings she is trying to 
win the therapist to her side 
thereby enabling her to have the 
son placed in foster care on her 
terms. The warm feelings the 
therapist read as "gratitude for 
the help" may, in fact, have been 
the glow of triumph. If so, the 
son's unaccustomed quiet could then 
understood as careful taking stock 
of the situation followed by a 
desparate counter attack. The boy's 
leaving and slamming the door was 
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directed at the new alliance the 
boy saw developing between 
therapist and mother. The 
therapist's own painful feelings of 
having failed the mother revealed 
to the therapist his alliance was 
with the mother and lead the 
therapist to newer and deeper 
respect for the sensitivities of 
this "out of control" boy. 
One of the many questions remaining 
is the relationship between the 
mother and boy as a team, and 
others in the family. Feelings ran 
high inside the circle of the boy 
and his mom. The reactions of the 
other family members were low keyed 
and, after the boy bolted from the 
room the therapist felt defeated in 
that he did not control the 
session. This suggests that a 
passive power struggle exists 
between the mother -and -son team 
and someone in the rest of the 
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family. The therapist has assumed 
someone's defeat.) 
Therapist turns to one of the siblings and tries to 
understand how he has fit into the system. He askes, 
"If an argument like this started at home and I weren't 
around to help, who would help?" The sib answers, 
"Grandma." 
"Not Father?," says the therapist, having lost his 
hypothesis. 
"No. Dad drives a truck and so he's not home much." 
Mother volunteers. "My mother helps." 
(The picture now suggests that the 
mother-and-son team are demanding 
that someone control their 
relationship — the circle of 
protest around the mother-son 
subsystem is at the level of power, 
perhaps at the level of abuse and 
even rejection. The 
abuse-to-rejection hypothesis is 
reasoned this way: if the father 
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doesn't attend to the family more 
then, as punishment, the boy will 
be banished to a group home and it 
will be the father's "fault." This 
hypothesis could be tested by 
asking the boy and others:"If you 
end up in a foster home, who will 
feel most responsible for that 
having happened?" We don't yet 
know why father drives truck, 
whether or not he's being extruded 
from the family. ) 
Therapist asks Father whether his Mother-in-Law does a 
better job than he does of controling the fights. The 
Father says that he does. 
Therapist asks Mother if she agrees. She says she does 
but he's always on the road. Father responds that its 
only on the road that he can make enough money. 
Therapist asks family who is best to bring the boy back 
into the room. 
(Possibly a basic issue coming out. 
This is suspected because it is a 
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spontaneous argument in the context 
of the argument about who is going 
to help Mother with Son. This would 
be a protest at the level of 
distraction: When Mother argues 
that she wants Father around more, 
Father cross-argues that he has to 
earn more money. It is an argument 
that goes in a circle and never 
resolves. Possibly it escalates 
into Mother's demand that Father 
be home more and from the to 
mother's abusive way with "his" 
son. More questions are suggested.) 
In this transcript, it can be seen how, by being sensitive 
to protests and counter-protests, by keeping track of areas 
of more and less heightened protest, a therapist can evolve 
a map of the system in protest. 
The Therapist's Use of the Stages and Goals Model 
to Monitor his own Position in the Field. 
As the transcript noted, the therapist must check his or her 
own feelings and also read the feelings and strivings of the 
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participants in the clinical system. If the therapist 
develops strong feelings of protest toward factions of the 
clinical system, there is a good chance that the therapist 
is being co-opted into siding with someone against someone. 
The therapist needs relative freedom of movement despite the 
protesting currents in a clinical system. This freedom comes 
from knowing how to recognize a current when one is caught 
in it. 
Therapist s feelings of annoyance, irritation, impatience 
indicate a protest in the "Distraction" stage. At this 
level, the currents in a clinical system will attempt to 
control the therapist's attention, to make sure he (or she) 
pays attention to this and not that. For example, it may 
be very difficult to pursue a line of questioning with a 
father without a mother interrupting. A therapist may learn 
that conversations with one person in a system are 
constantly the occassion for a second conversation to 
develop elsewhere, as if whatever is being said should be 
ignored. A therapist may observe that people forget what he 
wants them to remember. All of these behaviors, when 
accompanied by feelings of minor annoyance are signs that 
the therapist is not attending to things the way some in the 
sytem want. 
Ill 
At the next level, feelings of anger, frustration, challenge 
and defeat are a sign that the protest has become a power 
struggle. The strain in cooperation is in the second, or 
confrontation stage. I experience this stage in two ways, 
passively and actively. In either case, it is a sign that I 
am becoming too involved in counter-protest of some sort. My 
questions to myself when I have these feelings is, "With 
whom do I stand and whom do I oppose?" 
The indicators to the therapist that he or she is operating 
under the goal of abuse and participating in stage three, 
retribution, transactions, are feelings that have to do with 
hatred, insult, and revenge. Few operate nakedly under Goal 
Three intentions. There is ample cover in a popular ideology 
that suggests that it is acceptable to cause someone pain if 
it is for a person's punishment. However, the good 
intentions that lead to punishment are usually a cover for 
bitterness. I, myself, am tempted into the revenge position 
by the pain I see people inflicting on each other. For me, 
the moralism of the rescuer/punisher role is almost 
irresistable. 
Participants in stage three transactions often develop 
subtle methods of abuse. I find that my willingness to be 
impressed by subtlety helps me keep some distance from these 
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transactions. I do acknowledge my own cleverness in 
disguising my own bitter intentions from myself. I am 
vulnerable through my pride in my role as therapist. I have 
explained my failures to myself as though the failure were 
the fault of the client, that the client was too sick — not 
too sick for me to handle their bitterness" but simply "too 
sick" period. I leave my own limitations out of the 
assessment. I believe that clients can feel the negative 
assessment and that they find the negative assessment 
combined with the therapist's supposed authority on such 
matters to be horribly painful. 
A related way in which I have seen clients punished is the 
clinical "curse." The clinical curse is a prognosis 
disguised as a diagnosis. It is a description of pathology 
such that there is no hope for a cure. Often, in forensic 
evaluations, a clinical curse is requested by one part of a 
system to be used against another part of the system. 
This is not to say that there are not times in which severe 
and pessimistic evaluations are not appropriate and 
necessary. What is important in this discussion is the 
personal intention of the evaluator and the integrity of the 
therapist as manifested in his or her ability to acknowledge 
his or her own intentions and limitations. 
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Feelings that indicate the most intense level of protest, 
rejection, are even more difficult to catch in oneself in 
naked form than abusive feelings. Abusive intentions are 
hard to catch because they are so elabaorately justified. 
The whole point of rejecting feelings is to deny the person 
and the pain from consciousness. 
The first form of rejection, the pushing away of whole 
systems probably happens below conscious levels. It is 
possible to have such a thoroughly unproductive and 
miserable encounter with a client that neither one of you 
wants to see the other again. I suspect that these 
agreements are reached quickly. 
The second form of rejection happens when a therapist is 
co-opted and ends up placing an essential player in a system 
out of reach. 
The third form of rejection happens when a therapist is 
afraid to ask certain questions. ( This is to be 
distinguished from when the therapist planfully refrains 
from asking certain questions.) To dispel rejection is to 
reveal abuse. There are matters in the family that everyone 
knows about and no one wants to talk about. The reason for 
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rejecting an issue is the expectation that the discussion 
will make things worse. 
There is some subliminal negotiation between family and 
therapist as to what will be revealed in which order. With 
particularly loaded issues there is a certain amount of 
measuring by therapist and family. Families flash issues. 
Therapists color each question with tone of voice. Implicit 
contracts are made, much as with marriages. 
The Use of the Model to Devise a Strategic Intervention. 
In this section of the chapter, we will demonstrate yet 
another way to use the Stages and Goals model. The analysis 
of currents of protest can also suggest how to avoid 
fighting those currents and how, instead, to redirect the 
legitimate impulses forming those protests into a better 
pattern of solutions. 
Problem 
Portia had been diagnosed mentally retarded when she was a 
child and had grown up in a state institution. She was 
thirty three years old and had become a sweet, but pathetic 
woman. She was shy, hesitant, absent minded, and unkempt in 
a way that suggested to those who worked with her that she 
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was trying very hard to be acceptable but just didn't have 
what it took. 
Like so many others who have been socialized by institutions 
she had a powerful personal effect on all who came in 
contact with her. The effect seemed to be to divide the 
human world into two camps. Those who pitied her and who 
felt moved to care for her were in one camp. Those who 
abused her with nagging criticism and scorn were in the 
other. 
She lived in a supervised home with four other residents and 
four paraprofessional workers. The staff was often 
exasperated by her, and at times, even angry because she 
seemed almost perversely dense. They would explain to her 
what was needed and she seemed to understand at the time, 
then, later, it was as if she had forgotten the whole 
conversation. At other times, however she seemed to have a 
good memory. For example, she could keep track of days and 
knew when someone had promised her a trip to a store. 
The other residents ( who also carried a MR diagnosis) 
treated her in a manner that seemed an unattractive 
caricature of the attitude of the staff. They blamed her for 
not doing her chores, they picked on her, they took things 
116 
from her as "punishment.” Her response to the other 
residents' efforts was to become even more helpless. The 
other residents responded by picking at her with greater 
vehemence. The cycle between Portia and the residents would 
escalate until the staff felt compelled to interrupt it. 
The staff responded to the relationship between Portia and 
the other residents by defending "poor" Portia and by 
criticizing and censuring the other residents. Staff members 
were deeply concerned about the effects of the "helping" on 
s self-esteem. They also found themselves criticizing 
Portia for allowing herself to be bullied. In effect, the 
staff, by being critical of the other residents, was 
modeling the very behavior they wished to eliminate from the 
household. 
Analysis 
Portia's style is to demand attention, whether positively or 
negatively. She forgets what she is told, but she remembers 
when people promise to spend time with her. People find 
their feelings reaching out to her. Her shy, hesitant manner 
bring forth parental feelings in others. All this suggests 
that most of the time she pushes a demand for special 
attention against the world in which she finds herself. It 
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also suggests that she experiences some form of 
counter-protests. The counter-protest she experiences is 
that people try to make her change so that she will become 
someone that don't have to pay so much attention to. 
This demand for special attention is different than her 
status as a person in need of special attention. Other 
residents in this group home have the same status, but 
respond to their status in their own ways. 
The second realm of protest, and equally important is the 
anger and abuse that binds the staff and the other clients. 
We don't know that the clients are angry at the staff. We 
are told how the staff is angry at the clients and we assume 
the feelings are mutual. Anger indicates a power struggle. 
There seems to be a fight going on over who, or how, to help 
Portia. Occassionally the fight escalates to abuse when the 
staff punishes the clients for hurting Portia and the 
clients get even through Portia. 
Solution 
The question is how to avoid working against these currents 
and, at the same time, redirect them. 
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The alternate solution was to ask Portia to give an award 
each week to the household member, staff or client, who 
helped her the most. Portia was not expected to stop asking 
for help, but was now expected to evaluate the help she 
received. This increased her importance to others, required 
that she assert herself and, at the same time, supported her 
wish to be "special." The staff and clients were not 
expected to stop fighting over who or how to help Portia. 
All that was changed in this situation was that a judge was 
formally named, and who the judge was, was acceptable to 
all. 
Follow-up showed that this solution was immediately 
effective in terms of making that particular problem 
disappear. Portia still sought attention and also power, but 
she sought them in ways that contributed to the life of the 
home. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY. 
The Proposal again. 
The Stages and Goals model is one attempt to find the sense 
and order in suffering. Perhaps if we can describe the laws 
of misery, then we can do something to work around them. The 
model is also the product of an attempt to build conceptual 
bridges between Adlerian theory and Systems theory. It is 
proposed as a refinement in Adlerian theory. 
We started this inquiry at a great distance from the 
everyday specifics of psychological pain. We examined the 
laws developed to describe any kind of life process, painful 
or not. The PBA and Bateson's cybernetics were attempts to 
state the most fundamental of biological principles. (Once 
Bateson said that if he could discover the laws of 
interactaction that were held in common by humans, sea 
otters and octopii then he wold have discovered something 
very fundamental indeed. (Lipset, 1982)) The Varela 
principles of biological autonomy are so basic that they 
propose the defining characteristic of Life. Varela has said 
that, in order to declare something to be "alive," we have 
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to see how it maintains its own autonomy. (Varela, 1979) 
Of these basic theories we took eight principles and 
proposed that any theory of clinical psychology should 
contain realizations of, at least, those eight principles. 
Against those eight principles we compared the particular 
theory of clinical psychology by Alfred Adler. 
On the whole, Adler's theory nested into the basic 
constructs of the PBA well: for Adler, the principle 
definition of the human psyche was as a social phenemona 
and, at the same time, the principle by which each 
personality was a unified whole was held to be the highest 
governing principle of the soul. The fundamental sensitivity 
to both wholeness and context in both theories made for a 
good fit. 
However, it was necessary to propose a refinement in Adler's 
theory. Adler's theory was orginally constructed to capture 
ways of describing single individuals. The organizing 
principle of individual wholeness in Adler's theory was 
meant to apply only to single humans. The organizing 
principle of wholeness in PBA was the idea of a boundary 
between inside and outside that was the spontaneous result 
of a pattern of internal processes. In the PBA scheme, such 
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boundaries occured simultaneoulsy at many levels. What was 
needed was a way for the Adlerian clinician to also note 
multiple levels of autonomy. To give the Adlerian clinician 
that additional sensitivity we proposed a new term, which 
would be something like "Community," or, "Gemeinschaft," or 
even 'Self," be used to refer to the organized internal 
processes that maintain and create the Life Style. The 
original Adlerian term, Life Style, would be limited in use 
and would refer only to the way the whole functioned in the 
larger world. 
This new term, "Gemeinschaft," allowed us to refer to more 
than one level of autonomy. It also allowed us to refer to 
an autonomous system as experienced from the inside. The 
complementary terms of "Life Style" and "Gemeinschaft" 
allowed us ways of talking about the relationship between 
levels of autonomous sytems. We were able to speak of how 
the confluence of Life Styles "imbricated" a Gemeinschaft at 
the next higher level and how the requirements of the 
Gemeinschaft shaped the Life Styles at the next lower level. 
After having constructed this theoretical model, we used it, 
in turn, to construct a more immediate and practical 
counseling model which we could use to describe the 
processes of human suffering. 
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In this practical model, we said that, from time to time, 
the normal fabric of cooperation that holds the human 
community together gets strained. The needs of the various 
factions that form our communities simply do not always 
balance out perfectly with one another. The inevitable and 
utterly necessary give and take of life ends up placing 
exceptional demands on each of us and on our relationships 
with each other. There is a limit to how much we can 
accomodate each other, and that limit seems to be determined 
locally. As the limit is approached, compenent parts attack 
rather than support each other. Local civil wars break out. 
For example, a husband and a wife will fight with each other 
so hard about their kids behavior that their kids will 
attack them for being incompetent as parents. 
We tried to address the question :What causes the breakdown 
in cooperation? How can it be that each participating 
individual seems fully convinced of the correctness of what 
he or she is doing, and, if not the correctness, at least, 
the desparate necessity? We believed it was fair to ask for 
an answer because, we believed that, if people persist in 
creating misery, certainly they must have desparate and 
compelling reasons. 
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Our theory suggested that the source of the desparate and 
compelling reasons that lead people and systems into painful 
interaction is, at base, integrity. In the name of 
self-identity, in order to preserve the meaning of ones own 
life, in the name of something terribly precious, however it 
is subjectively defined, people will resort to desparate 
means and submit to painful choices. 
We were not able to explore fully how the requirement of 
desparate measures makes cooperation breaks down in some 
instances and not in others. Our analysis suggested that 
cooperation breaks down when the demands of the larger 
system for its integrity have the effect of being 
contradictory to the demands of the component parts for 
their self's integrity. 
We did note that, when questions arise on the order of, 
"Which is more important, the whole of which I am a part , 
or me?", then some sort of moral struggle is being 
approached. To be true to myself or true to my friends? 
true to myself or true to my wife; true to myself or 
true to my children. These disjunctive questions are the 
sources of human misery. Or at least, these seemed to be 
the noblest and most universal ways we could find of 
describing them. 
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We proposed an Adlerian position which agrees with 
Watzlawick's position (Watzlawick, et.al. 1976); 
psychopathology is a problem that has become compounded 
though misguided solutions. We described four stages of 
compounding. 
We belieave that it helps if one knows some of the 
mechanisms by which mistakes are made. We spent some time 
describing possible mistakes. We also spend some time 
describing how a clinician might use the model to find hope 
and order in what looks like a hopeless messes. 
Bateson's riddle again. 
Much of this book was also an attempt to probe Bateson's "so 
what" riddle. Bateson ended his book. Mind and Nature with 
the question, "why write the book?" He had said that life 
has its own way of healing itself, which may or may not 
include the extinction of a species in the process. Why then 
should any one person, a very small and transitory part of 
the big whole, be so concerned about what is going to 
happen? So what? 
An equivalent riddle could be put to the clinical 
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psychologist. Why does it really matter whether or not this 
family's daughter starves herself, or whether or not a 
marriage breaks up, or whether or not children are abused? 
It does seem to matter. Because, as this whole project has 
argued from many different angles, it is because we are 
individuals only partially. We are also participants in 
larger life forms, larger individualities that extend beyond 
our own lives and encompass it. It seems that these larger 
forms also have "feelings." We accept the suffering of our 
fellows as part of our membership in a life larger than our 
own. 
The Mexico City earthquake of 1985 left thousands dead. 
There was a hospital in the center of the city that 
collapsed in on itself. Expensive teams of rescue workers 
built delicate tunnels through the debris to find survivors. 
Estimates were that survivors could last no more than four 
days under the mountain of rubble. Yet the teams worked for 
eight days and no one questioned the extra expense. 
In January 1986, ten years after the United States Supreme 
Court decided to allow abortion of pregnancies in the first 
trimester, there was strong enough protest to challenge the 
wisdom of that decision that the question remains a 
respectable topic of national debate. The point the 
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protesters made was that the fetus, once conceived, was as 
alive as any human on earth, and therefore entitled to to 
legal protection from murder. 
When the muscles of the face engaged in smiling are 
activated, a general system is activated in the whole body 
which increases the health of the body. Smiles engage more 
than facial muscles. Yet in addition to this, smiles are 
infectious and people who smile tend to make others smile. 
We are never only participating in our own lives. 
It seems that, by recognizing as fully as we can, the 
preciousness of any life, we also recognize the preciousness 
of our own life. There is something sacramental in 
acknowledging the connections between our own life and the 
life beyond it. 
This, I believe, is the answer to Bateson's riddle and also 
the connection between Bateson's riddle and the theory of 
protesting systems. Much of what we do is an expression of, 
and service, to individualities of which we are a part, 
which encompass and form us. In the context of this, we 
would have to conclude that psychotherapy is, most 
basically, a form of reconciliation. 
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Finally, it is important to touch on some of the 
implications of the FS/FG model for the Adlerian theory of 
Individual Psychology, should some Adlerian colleague wish 
to pick up this line of inquiry.The expansion of Adlerian 
thinking into a systemic base has repercussions for the 
original, non-system Adlerian model. Here are some of the 
repercussions I could note: 
1• The Stages and Goals Model, which is a mapping of 
patterns of strain in a gemeinschaft, or whole, could also 
be applied to the internal dynamics of the life style of an 
individual person. This would modify Adlerian theory as 
concerns individual pathology, which up to now has eschewed 
ideas of internal conflict, insisting that the whole cannot 
be divided against itself. 
The new model would accept the old Adlerian premise that the 
individuality cannot be divided without dying, losing its 
integrity, dis-integrating. At the same time this new idea 
of "strains" could describe how the individuality, in its 
own experience of itself can feel "strained," as if it were 
about to be divided, as if it were threatened with a kind of 
death, a defeat. 
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Internal dynamics can be described in terms of the four 
stages of strain. Currently Adlerian psychodynamics describe 
pathology as manfested in interaction by "hesitating 
movement" and "back and forth movement" (Adler, 1956) and 
manifested in personal epistemology as an "errors" (Adler, 
1956), "basic mistakes" (Dreikurs, 1953), and "interfering 
ideas" (Powers and Griffin, page 15) 
We could further suggest that internal strains could be 
described as proceeding along the same four stage 
progression. At first one is distracted from the task at 
hand by the awareness of a loyalty conflict. Then one is 
torn between attending to the need for A or the need for B. 
When it gets worse, one punishes oneself for failing one or 
the other obligations, or for compromising oneself. The last 
stage in the progression is dissociation. 
2. An additional important way in which this new model would 
modify Adlerian individual theory is in terms of the object 
of protest. Currently, pathology is a form of hesitation in 
response to what are called "the task of life." The 
modification proposed thus far would characterize pathology 
as a form of hesitation in resonse to the tasks of the next 
larger unity to which the individual is a part, rather than 
in terms of a generalized response to Life. In other words, 
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rather than saying an individual is sabotaging her marriage 
because she has something against the Institution of 
Marriage, we would say that an individual is sabotaging her 
marriage because she has something against the particular 
marriage she is in. We would not generalize unnecessarily 
beyond the data. I believe this modification would free 
Adlerian Psychology of some of its own moralism. 
3. The model holds some implications for the process of 
individual therapy and individual assessement. The therapist 
knows the client through his paid relationship with the 
client and through his place in the protesting system which 
created the client role.. Therefore, the therapist never 
attains the true subjective perspective of the client 
independent of context. There is a profound difference 
between assuming an underlying coherence which is 
independent of context and assuming that one can know what 
it is. This model suggests that clinical assessment is a 
comment on the marriage formed by the clinical system, which 
includes the therapist in the context of counter-protesting 
in-laws. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
n?dsr( A*Th(1?5^-*L* Anschabacher & R. R. Anscbacher (Eds*) The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: A 
systematic presentation in selections from his writing. New 
York: Harper and Row. -- 
Adler, A. (1964) 
New York: Pulman. 
Social interest: a challenge to mankind. 
(Original work published 1933) 
Adler, A. (1980) What life should mean to you. New York: 
Perigree Books. (Original work published 1931) 
Ansbacher, H. L. , (1980) The concept of social interest. 
FCC , 11, 2, 1980. 
Bateson, G. (1972a) Introduction: The science of mind and 
order. In Bateson, G. , Steps to an ecology of mind. New 
York: Ballantine Books. 
Bateson, G. (1972b) Style , grace and information in 
primitive art. In Bateson, G. Steps to an ecology of mind. 
New York: Ballantine Books. 
Bateson, G. (1972c) Conscious purpose versus nature. In 
Bateson, G. Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: 
Ballantine Books. ’ 
Bateson, G. (1972d) Form, substance and difference. In 
Bateson, G. Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: 
Ballantine Books. 
Bateson, G. (1972e) Cybernetics of self. In Bateson, G. 
Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Bateson, G. (1972f) Cybernetic explanation. In Bateson, 
G. Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballantine 
Books. 
Bateson, G. (1977) Afterword. In J. Brockman (ed) About 
Bateson: Essays on Gregory Bateson by : Mary Catherine 
Bateson, Ray Birdwhistel1, John Brockman, David Lipset, 
Rollo May, Margaret Mead, Edwin Schlossberg. New York: 
E.P. Dutton. 
Bateson, G. (1979) Mind and nature: A necessary unity. 
New York: E. P. Dutton. 
130 
Bitter' J* (1985) An interview with Harold Mosak. 
Psychology: The Journal of Adlerian Theory, 
Research and Practice, 4T~, 386-421.- 
131 
Bowen, M. (1978) Family therapy in clinical practice. New 
York: Jason Aronson" 
Coppersmith, E. (1983) The family and public service 
systems: an assessment method. In Diagnosis and assessment 
in family therapy. J.C. Hansen (ed.) and B.P. Keeney (vol. 
ed.). Rockville, Md. : Aspen Systems. 
Dell, P.F. (1982) In search of truth: One the way to 
clinical epistemology, Family Process, 21, 429-435. 
Dell, P.F. (1985) Understanding Bateson and Maturana: 
Toward a biological foundation for the social sciences. 
Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 11 , 1-21. 
De Shazer, S. (1982) Patterns of brief family therapy: an 
ecosystemic approach. New York: Guilford. 
Deutsch, D. (1967) Family Therapy and Family Life Style. 
Journal of Individual Psychology, 23, 2, 217-230. 
Dinkmeyer, D. C.& Dinkmeyer, D.C. Jr., (1981) Adlerian 
family therapy. The American Journal of Family Therapy, 
945-52. 
Dinkmeyer, D. C., Pew, W. L., & Dinkmeyer, D. C., Jr. (1979) 
Adlerian Counseling and Psychotherapy. Monterey, 
California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 
Dreikurs, R. (1953) Fundamentals of Adlerian Psychology. 
Chicago: Alfred Adler Institute. 
Dreikurs, R. and Soltz, V. (1964) Children: The challenge. 
New York: Duell, Sloan, Pearce. 
Dreikurs, R. (1967a) The psychological interview in 
medicine. (1954) In Pychodynamics, psychotherapy and 
counseling: Collected papers of Rudolph Dreikurs, M.D. 
(Revised Edition, 1973) Chicago: Alfred Adler Institute. 
Dreikurs, R. (1967b) Counseling for family adjustment 
(1949) . In Pychodynamics, psychotherapy and counseling: 
Collected papers of Rudolph Dreikurs, M.D. (Revised 
Edition, 19731 Chicago: Alfred Adler Institute. 
132 
El1is / A. (1973) Rational-Emotive 
(Ed.) Current Psychotherapies. 
Peacock Publishers, Inc. 
Therapy. 
Itasca, II 
In R. 
linois 
Corsini 
F. E. 
Forgus, R. & Shulman, B. (1979) 
view. New Jersey: Prentic-Hal1, 
Personality. A cognitive 
Inc. 
Haley, J. (1971) A review of the family therapy field, in 
Changing Families, J. Haley (ed.) New York: Grune and 
Stratton. 
Haley, J. (1977) Problem-solving therapy. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Hoffman, L. (1981) Foundations of family therapy: A 
conceptual framework for sytems change. New York: Basic 
Books, Inc. 
Hoffman, L. (1983) A co-evolutionary framework for 
systemic family therapy. In Diagnosis and assessment in 
family therapy. J.C. Hansen (ed.) and B.P. Keeney (vol. 
ed.). Rockville, Md. : Aspen Systems. 
Horney, K. (1950) Neurosis and human growth: The struggle 
toward self-realization. New York: W. W. Northon and 
Company, Inc. 
Jantsch, E. (1980) The Self-organizing universe: 
Scientific and human implications of the emerging paradigm 
of evolution. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Jones, C. W. (1985) Strategic intervention within a 
no-treatment frame. Family Process, 24, 583-596. 
Keeney, B. P. (1982) Not pragmatic, not aesthetics. 
Family Process, 21, 429-435. 
Lipset, D. (1980) Gregory Bateson: The legacy of a 
scientiest. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Keeney, B. P. (1983) Aesthetics of change. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Minuchin, S. (1974) Families and family therapy. 
Cambridge: Harvard. 
Mosak, H. (1977) Early recollections as a projective 
technique. In On purpose: Collected papers . Chicago: 
Alfred Adler Institute. 
133 
Mosak, H. & Shulman, B. (1977) 
syllabus Chicago: Alfred Adler 
Clinical Assessment: A 
Institute. 
Penn, P. (1982) Circular Questioning. Family Process. 
267-280. 
Selvini-Palazzoli, M. (1978) Self-starvation: From 
individual_to family therapy in the treatment of anorexia 
nervosa. Rev. English Edition New York: Jason Aronson. 
Selvini- Palazzoli, M. (1985) The problem of the sibling as 
the referring person. Journal of Marital and Family 
Therapy, 11 , 21-35. 
Selvini-Palazzoli, M., Boscolo, L., Cecchin, G., & Prata, 
G., (1980a) The problem of the referring person. Journal 
of Marital and Family Therapy, 6, 3-9. 
Selvini-Palazzoli, M., Boscolo, L., Cecchin, G., & Prata, 
G., (1980b) Hypothesizing — circularity — neutrality: 
three guidelines for the conductor of the session. Family 
Process , 19, 3-12. 
Shulman, B. (1973a) Life style. In Contributions to 
Individual Psychology: Selected papers by Bernard H. 
Shulman, M.D. Chicago: Alfred Adler Institute. 
Shulman, B. (1973b) The family constellation. In 
Contributions to Individual Psychology: Selected papers by 
Bernard H. Shulman, M.D. Chicago: Alfred Adler Institute. 
Sluzki, C. (1975) The coalitionary process in integrating 
family therapy. Family Process , 14_ 67-78. 
Sluzki, C. (1983) Process, structure, and world views: 
towards an integrated view of systemic models in family 
therapy. Family Process , 22, 469-476. 
Taggart, M. (1982) • Linear versus systemic values: 
Implications for family therapy. In L. L'Abate (ed.) 
Values, ethics, legalities and the family therapist. 
Maryland: Aspen Systems. 
Terner, J. & Pew, W. L. (1978) The courage to be 
imperfect: The life and work of Rudolph Dreikurs. New 
York: Hawthorne. 
Varela, F. J. (1979) Principles of biological autonomy. 
New York: North Holland, Inc. 
134 
Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J. & Jackson, D. (1967) Pragmatics 
of Human Communication: a study of interactional patterns, 
pathologies and paradoxes. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
Watzlawick, P., Weakland, J., and Fisch, R. (1974) 
Change: Principles of problem formation and problem 
resolution. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Watzlawick, P. (1983) The situation is hopeless but not 
serious: The pursuit of unhappiness. New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, Inc. 
Whittaker, C (1982) From Psyche to System: The evolving 
therapy of Carl Whittaker. J. R. Neil & D. P. Kniskern 
(Ed.) New York: Guilford. 

